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The War on Drugs is not the first battle in which zealous
warriors, frustrated by the limits of the law, have called for the
abridgement or abolition of fundamental civil liberties. We have
seen other wars and other constitutional casualties .... And when
the war is over, we find that departures from constitutional norms,
legitimized by the courts, have lasting and wide-ranging effects.
Constitutional principles, once abandoned, are not easily re-
claimed.'
INTRODUCTION
Former President Ronald Reagan declared war on drugs in 1982.2
His successors, George Bush and Bill Clinton, both swore to continue
the fight.' The federal government has since spent billions of dollars
waging this war,4 allocating most of the money for enforcement.5
1. Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting)
(discussing constitutional validity of random drug testing), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991).
2. john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War The National Purse, the
Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 557 (1991) (citing President
Reagan's Radio Address to the Nation, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRs. Doc. 1249, 1249 (Oct. 2, 1982));
see also Alfred W. McCoy & Alan A. Block, U.S. Narcotics Policy: An Anatomy of Failure in WAR ON
DRUGS: STUDIES IN THE FAILURE OF U.S. NARCOTICS POLICY 1 (Alfred W. McCoy & Alan A. Block
eds., 1992) (claiming that drug war is really war on cocaine).
3. See Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1993) (noting how President Clinton "articulated his opposition to
any fundamental change in American policy toward drugs"); powell & Hershenov, supra note
2, at 557 (discussing former President Bush's promise to fight drug war).
4. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY:
BUDGET SUMMARY 2 (1994) (stating that federal anti-drug spending soared from $1.5 billion in
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Although record numbers of drug offenders are being locked up in
our prisons,6 statistics indicate that drug use and drug dealing remain
constant.' While some observers question whether the war on drugs
is working,' one conclusion is inescapable: the principal victims of
the war on drugs are racial minorities and the Constitution itself.9
1981 to just under $12 billion in 1992, and that President Clinton requested record $13.2 billion
for 1995); Sam Vincent Meddis, Is the Drug War Racist? Disparities Suggest the Answer is Yes, USA
TODAY, July 23, 1993, at Al (noting that federal anti-drug spending went from approximately
$1.2 billion in 1981 to nearly $12 billion in 1992).
5. Seepowell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 567 n.26 (explaining that National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) estimates that Bush administration allocated three-
fourths of drug budget for law enforcement and remaining one-fourth for treatment) (citing
NACDL, The Black Community and the Cost of the "War on Drugs," CHAMPION, Nov. 1990, at 18,19).
The Clinton administration has set aside 35% of the drug budget for treatment and prevention
in 1995, with the rest going toward law enforcement. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
REDUCING THE IMPACT OF DRUGS ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 12 (1995).
6. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 786 n.62 (E.D. Mo.) (noting that, as ofJuly
1993, 60.4% of inmates in federal prisons were convicted of drug-related offenses, up from
24.9% in 1980), rev'd 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995); OFFICE
OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 5, at 12 (illustrating that during 1992, approximate-
ly 48,000 of 80,000 federal prisoners were drug offenders); Pierre Thomas, 1 in 3 Young Black
Men injustice System: Criminal Sentendng Policies Cited in Study, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1995, atA1,
A4 (noting that estimated number of drug inmates jumped from 57,975 in 1983 to 353,564 in
1993); see also Finkelman, supra note 3, at 1396 (stating that United States has larger percentage
of its population in prison than any other nation).
7. See McCoy & Block, supra note 2, at 2-3 (reporting that daily cocaine use by "hard core
addicts" increased 15% between 1988 and 1990). The National Institute on DrugAbuse (NIDA)
estimated that the number of daily cocaine users jumped from 292,000 in 1988 to 336,000 in
1990. Id. at 3 (citing Joseph B. Treaster, Bush Hails Drug Use Decline in a Survey Some See as
F1awed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1990, at B14). Furthermore, in 1991, the General Accounting
Office reported that "the estimated volume of drugs entering the country during 1989 and 1990
did not decline." Id.
8. See McCoy & Block, supra note 2, at 2 (claiming that, despite White House claims to
contrary, mounting evidence suggests drug war and its underlying policy of repression have
failed); powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 614-15 (arguing that war on drugs is more than
just ineffective, it has severe constitutional costs and hurts opportunities for blacks). Several
commentators have also criticized the use of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses
as either unwise or unfair to racial minorities. See Nancy E. Roman, Mandatory Drug Senten.es
Lead to Inequities; Rules Force Jails to Free Violent Felons, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at A8
(questioning mandatory minimum prison terms for drug offenders because they keep low-level
drug offenders in jail, forcing parole boards to release violent criminals instead); id. (noting that
Representative E. Clay Shaw, Jr., an advocate for mandatory minimums in 1986, now calls for
Congress to reconsider them, stating that politicians have to correct mistakes they make). Shaw
noted that "[i]n politics as everything else, people have to take a look at what they did, and if
they think they made a mistake, correct it." Id.; see also Mandatory Sentencing is Criticized by Justice,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at A22 (quoting Justice Kennedy's statement to subcommittee of
House of Representatives on problems of mandatory minimums for drug crimes). Justice
Kennedy stated that "I simply do not see how Congress can be satisfied with the results of the
mandatory minimums for possession of crack cocaine." Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House
Comm on Appropriations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1994) (statement ofJustice Kennedy).
9. powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 559; see also Ron Harris, Blacks Take Brunt of War
on Drugs, LA. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990, at Al (commenting that "around the country, politicians,
public officials and even many police officers and judges say, the nation's war on drugs has in
effect become a war on black people"); Sheryl McCarthy, Off Target Targets of Drug War, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 1990, at 6 (reporting that "as the so-called 'war on drugs' escalates, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the targets of choice in this crusade are overwhelmingly blacks
and Latinos").
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Cocaine base, otherwise known as "crack cocaine" or "crack,"
caused a scare in the mid-1980s as many commentators warned of the
growing availability and use of this "cheap, highly addictive, and
deadly form of cocaine.""° The media sparked this concern, declar-
ing the outbreak of a national "crack epidemic."" One journalist
wrote that because of crack, "[m]en have given up their paychecks.
Women have prostituted themselves. Children have stolen from their
parents. Men and women have stolen appliances, jewelry and
televisions from their families and friends." 2 Many people feared
that use of crack by young adults was on the rise"3 and realized, as
the death of basketball star Len Bias demonstrated, that cocaine could
kill. 4 This perception led former federal drug czar William Bennett
to proclaim crack cocaine to be "our biggest and most immediate
problem." 5
Congress responded swiftly and decisively to the hysteria over crack
cocaine.' 6  In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,"
which contained the so-called "crack statute," under which it adopted
a hundred-to-one ratio, treating one gram of crack as equivalent to
10. "Crack" Cocaine: HearingBefore the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Crack Cocaine Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Roth).
11. SeePeter Kerr, Drug Treatment in City Is Strained by Crack a Potent New Cocaine, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 1986, at Al (referring to increase in crack cocaine use as "crack epidemic"); Jacob V.
LamarJr., "Crack": A Cheap and Deadly Cocaine Is a Spreading Menace, TIME, June 2, 1986, at 16,
16 (announcing that crack is "highly potent, highly addictive form of cocaine that is rapidly
becoming a scourge"); Tom Morganthau et aL., Kids and Cocaine, NEWNVEEK, Mar. 17, 1986, at
58, 58 (claiming that, in 1986, cocaine abuse was fastest growing drug problem in America),
reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 4418 (1986); Richard M. Smith, The PlagueAmong Us: The Drug Crisis,
NEvSwEEK,June 16, 1986, at 15, 15 (likening spread of crack to plagues of medieval Europe and
promising to cover crack "crisis" as aggressively as civil rights struggle, war in Vietnam, and end
of Nixon's presidency).
12. 132 CONG. REC. 8291 (1986) (citing Paul Blythe, It's Cheap, It'sAvailable and It's Ravaging
Society, PALM BEACH POST & EVENING TIMES).
13. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 1 (statement of Sen. Roth) (noting recent
survey showing that 30% of college students had used cocaine by end of their senior year);
Morganthau et al., supra note 11, at 58 (discussing how American children are "increasingly at
risk to the nightmare of cocaine addiction"), reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 4418 (1986).
14. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Roth) (discussing death
of Len Bias from suspected cocaine overdose); Nancy Cooper et al., The Mysteiy of a Star's Death,
NEWSWEEK,June 30, 1986, at 29, 29 (describing events leading up to tragic death of Len Bias).
15. BennettAsks TougherDrugFight DecaringCrack "BigstProblem", N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1989,
at A14; see also BARBARA C. WALLACE, CRACK COCAINE: A PRACTICAL TREATMENT APPROACH FOR
THE CHEMICALLY DEPENDENT 9 (1991) (discussing problem of crack cocaine). But seeAdam Paul
Weisman, I Was a Drug-HypeJunkie: 48 Hours on Crack Stree NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1986, at 14,
16 (stating that experts agree that number one drug threat in America is alcohol).
16. H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize Is a Road to Ruin: When More Is LesT, 8 CRIM.JUST.
8, 12 (1993) (explaining that under Controlled Substances Act of 1970 Congress abolished
Commerce Clause limitation on narcotics control; thus, every drug crime that is offense under
state law can also be prosecuted in federal courts).
17. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994)).
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one hundred grams of powder cocaine for sentencing purposes.' 8
The sentencing provisions in the crack statute provide that a person
convicted of possession and distribution of fifty grams of crack be
given a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years, the same as a
defendant convicted of possession and distribution of five thousand
grams of powder cocaine. 9 In other words, both provisions punish
the same drug-cocaine-but crack is penalized one hundred times
more than powder cocaine.2"
Recent statistics reveal that, nationally, close to ninety percent of
the defendants convicted of federal crack violations have been black,
while only about four percent have been white.2" Because each of
these defendants is given the ten year mandatory minimum sentence,
district court Judge Cahill, in United States v. Clary,2 2 concluded that
the crack statute "has been directly responsible for incarcerating
nearly an entire generation of young black American men for very
long periods, usually during the most productive time of their
lives., 23 In 1994, in fact, 32.2% of young black men between the
18. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A)(iii) (1994). Section 841(b) (1)(A) (iii) provides that any
person convicted of possession with intent to distribute "50 grams or more of a mixture or
substance ... which contains [crack]" shall be sentenced to no less than 10 years in prison. Id.
The same penalty, under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (ii) (II), is imposed on a person possessing
5000 grams or more of cocaine powder. Similarly, United States Sentencing Guidelines
(U.S.S.G.) §§ 2D1.1(a)(3) and (c)(13) equate one gram of cocaine base with 100 grams of
powder cocaine for sentencing purposes. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2D1.1 (1994) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDEINES MANUAL]. Because the Sentencing
Commission derived the hundred-to-one ratio from § 841(b), see United States v. Clary, 846 F.
Supp. 768, 770 n.2 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172
(1995), this Note treats the mandatory minimum disparity in § 841(b) and U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 as
the same. In Clary, the district court and the Eighth Circuit did so also. Claty, 846 F. Supp. at
770 n.2; Clary, 34 F.3d at 710 n.1.
19. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (outlining provisions of crack statute). A
person convicted of simple possession of five grams (the weight of two pennies) of crack cocaine
receives a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (iii) (1994).
The same amount of powder cocaine, on the other hand, is a misdemeanor that carries no
mandatory minimum and a maximum penalty of one year injail. Id. § 844(a).
20. Claiy, 846 F. Supp. at 770.
21. See id. at 786 (noting that in 1992, 92.6% of those convicted of federal crack violations
were black, while only 4.7% were white) (citing U.S. Sentencing Commission representative
sample of all drug cases received for fiscal year 1992). In comparison, 45.2% of those sentenced
for cocaine powder violations in 1992 were white while 20.7% were black. Id. In 1993, 88.3%
of those convicted of selling crack were black and 4.1% were white. Cocaine: Crack and Powder,
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1995, at A20. During the same year, 32% of those convicted for selling
powder cocaine were white and 27.4% were black. Id.
22. 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1172 (1995).
23. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 770 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995); see also powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 569-70
(noting that there are more black men in prison than in college). Jailing young black men can
have long term affects as well. See Harris, supra note 9, at A26 (noting that low-income blacks,
some of whom are already crippled by lack of education and job skills, are released with felony
records that make them even less employable).
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ages of twenty and twenty-nine were either in prison, jail, or on
probation or parole compared to only 6.7% of young white males.24
The number of young black men under judicial system supervision is
up more than thirty percent since 1989 when about twenty-five
percent were under the supervision of the criminal justice, system.25
Experts argue that the number of young black men in prison is a
result of "a greater number of defendants receiving prison sentences,
especially for drug offenses, rather than an increase in the number of
crimes committed by black men."26
In early 1995, the United States Sentencing Commission examined
the crack and powder cocaine sentencing disparity.27 In April of that
year, the Commission recommended that defendants convicted of
crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses be treated equally,
recommending increased penalties only when weapons were used or
injuries occurred during the drug crime.2' These recommendations
were scheduled to become law unless Congress passed blocking
legislation before November 1, 1995.29 Attorney General Janet Reno
strongly urged Congress to reject such proposals."0 In the fall of
1995, both the House and the Senate passed legislation to kill the
Sentencing Commission's recommendations, which President Clinton
signed into law on October 30, 1995.3' The disparate treatment of
24. Thomas, supra note 6, at Al.
25. Thomas, supra note 6, at Al.
26. Thomas, supra note 6, at Al. The study was conducted by the Sentencing Project, a
Washington-based, non-profit organization. Id.
27. Toni Locy, Reno Assails Parity in Drug Crime Penalties: Punishment Depends on Form of
Cocaine, WASH. PoST, Apr. 16, 1995, at A17.
28. Id.
29. Jeffrey Abramson, Making the Law Colorblind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995, at A15
(editorial).
30. Locy, supra note 27, at A17.
31. Ann Devroy, Clinton Retains Tough Law on Crack Cocaine: Panel's Call to End Disparity In
Drug Sentencing is Rejected, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1995, at Al. The joint effort by Congress and
President Clinton in passing legislation to kill the Sentencing Commission's recommendations
was the first time in the Commission's seven-year history that Congress and the White House
blocked one of its recommendations. Id. at A4. The public has expressed its outrage- at
President Clinton and Congress. See id. (stating thatJesse L.Jackson called Clinton's decision
"a moral disgrace" and Congressional Black Caucus said sentencing disparities "make a mockery
ofjustice"); Francis X. Clines, After March, House Votes on Emotional Racial Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 1995, at B12 (explaining that disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences was "an
emphatic concern" at Million Man March held in Washington, D.C., on October 16,1995); Mary
Pat Flaherty & Pierre Thomas, Crack Sentences Angered Inmates, Officials Warned: Prison Bureau
Raised Possiility of Riots, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1995, atAl, A12 (noting that Federal Bureau of
Prisons warned that House's decision to keep disparities between sentences for crack and
powder cocaine offenses may have caused prison riots in Alabama, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and
Illinois); President Clinton and Crack, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1995, at A3O (editorial) (stating that
President Clinton's decision to sign legislation designed to maintain enhanced penalty provisions
for crack was "the easy, politically safe choice, but it was the wrong one").
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crack and power cocaine, therefore, remains the law. 2
The statistical correlation between race and convictions under the
crack statute implicates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendmente3 and the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.' As one court noted, "the
challenged classification appears to impose a substantially dispropor-
tionate burden on the very class of persons whose history inspired the
principles of equal protection." 5 The equal protection argument is
that the penalty differential of the hundred-to-one ratio of crack to
cocaine has a disproportionate impact on blacks because they are
more likely to possess crack than whites, who more often possess
powder cocaine.36  Therefore, providing longer sentences for
possession of crack than for the same amount of powder cocaine
treats a similarly situated person in a dissimilar manner, violating his
or her equal protection right under the law.
37
This Note uses United States v. Clary to analyze the issue of whether
the hundred-to-one ratio in § 841(b) violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Part I sets
forth the legal standards relevant to any equal protection challenge.
Part II discusses the legislative rationale behind enactment of the
crack statute. Part III analyzes the reasons behind both the district
court's conclusion that the crack statute violates equal protection and
the Eighth Circuit's reversal. Part IV discusses unconscious racism
and the widespread public association of crack with race at the time
Congress provided the enhanced penalty provisions for crack cocaine.
Finally, Part V uses unconscious racism together with other factors to
conclude that the Eighth Circuit erred in failing to find proof of
discrimination. PartV argues that the district court, instead, correctly
applied the highest level of judicial scrutiny and properly found the
crack statute to be unconstitutional.
32. But seeJoan Biskupic, Justices to Hear L.A. Case Alleging Racial Prosecution, WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 1995, at A6 (discussing Supreme Court's decision to hear case that federal prosecutors
selectively prosecuted blacks for crack cocaine violations); Joan Biskupic, High Court to Hear
Mandatory Sentence Dispute: At Issue Is Discretion of FederalJudges in Relaxing Tesms for Cooperative
Defendants, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1995, at A10 (noting Supreme Court's announcement to hear
case raising issue of whether federaljudges have discretion to lower sentences of drug traffickers
who are subject to mandatory minimum sentence but who cooperate with prosecutors).
33. U.S. CONS. amend. X1V, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.").
35. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991).
36. C/ay, 846 F. Supp. at 770.
37. 1&. (noting arguments from defendant's brief).
1995]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:497
I. BACKGROUND
The district court in Clary stated that the hundred-to-one ratio of
crack to powder cocaine, coupled with the mandatory minimum
sentencing provided by the crack statute, "reeks with inhumanity and
injustice. "8 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) purports to punish criminal activity
for both crack and powder cocaine, but blacks using crack are
punished more severely than whites using the same amount of powder
cocaine.3 9 In fact, the disparity is so disproportional that the district
court found it "shocks the conscience."4" This disparate impact, in
turn, raises equal protection issues. If race rather than conduct was
the motivating factor behind the enhanced penalty provisions for
crack cocaine, the crack statute violates the equal protection rights of
black Americans.4
A. The Equal Protection Clause and Suspect Classifications
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment command that similarly situated people be treated
alike.42 To determine whether a law violates equal protection, courts
must first ask if the law treats similarly situated people in a dissimilar
manner; if it does, courts must then balance the interests of the
individual against the interests of the government seeking to regulate
the individual.43  This balancing approach focuses on the ends
sought by the government and the means chosen to achieve those ends.'
38. Id. at 772.
39. Id. at 770 (stating that punishment for possession and distribution of 50 grams of crack
cocaine is same as for 5000 grams of powder cocaine).
40. Id.
41. Id. (noting defendant's argument that because blacks are more likely to possess crack
than whites, similarly situated defendants are being treated in dissimilar manner).
42. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 773. The
United States Supreme Court originally interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit
government officials from discriminating on the basis of race. SeeThe Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873) (construing Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe all state-
imposed discrimination against blacks). The Court later interpreted the Equal Protection Clause
to prohibit regulations disparately burdening "discrete and insular" minorities historically
subjected to discriminatory treatment. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that there should be additional protection for suspect
classifications). The Court has held that where the federal government makes a classification
which, if made by a state, would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, then the classification violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
43. Ann L. Iijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium: "Old Formulations" or
"New Articulations"-, 20 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 337, 340 (1994).
44. IM. at 340; see State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991) (evaluating whether
state's goal of targeting street drug dealers was met by-statute providing harsher penalties for
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Courts apply one of three different standards of review depending
on the group being burdened and the nature of the constitutional
interest at issue.' They use the "rational basis" standard to review
general social welfare or economic regulations.' Under this lowest
level of review, the government's ends need only be legitimate and
the means must be rationally related to the achievement of those
ends. 7 Equal protection of the laws does not always mean equal
treatment, but it does require that differential treatment have some
relevance to the purpose for which the legislation is made. 8
Courts use the next level of review, the "intermediate scrutiny"
standard, to review classifications by gender. 9 This test requires that
the gender-based legislation serve important government objectives
and be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.5
The highest level of review, the "strict scrutiny" standard, applies
when a court faces legislation which burdens persons based on race
or national origin, or burdens fundamental individual liberties.51
Under this standard, the government must show that the classification
possession of crack than for powder cocaine).
45. See Clark v. jester, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (noting that to determine whether
legislation violates equal protection, Court applies different levels of scrutiny to different types
of classification); see also lijima, supra note 43, at 341 (listing three factors courts apply to
determine standard: (1) nature of government's interest; (2) nature of individual interest
burden; and (3) identity of class burdened).
46. See Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (applying rational
basis standard to statute regulating pumping of gas); see also lijima, supra note 43, at 342 (noting
that between 1865 and 1937, Supreme Court used rational basis test to invalidate numerous
economic regulations).
47. Montague v. Richardson, 24 Conn. 338 (1856); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (laying foundation for rational basis standard ofjudicial review).
In McCulloch, ChiefJustice Marshall stated, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional." it
48. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 773 (E.D. Mo.) ("'Equal protection does
not require that all persons be dealt with identically... [but] it does require that a distinction
[that is] made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made."'
(quoting Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966))), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denie4, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
49. Ijima, supra note 43, at 345.
50. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("Classifications by gender must serve
important government objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."); see J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994) (holding that intentional
discrimination on basis of gender in use of'peremptory strikes violated Equal Protection Clause);
Craig, 429 U.S. at 204 (holding that gender-based differential on sales of 3.2% beer violated
Equal Protection Clause); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (holding that mandatory
preference of one gender over other in appointment of administrators of intestate decedents'
estates violated Equal Protection Clause).
51. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (expressing view that legal
restrictions on single racial group must be subject to most rigid scrutiny); see also Iijima, supra
note 43, at 344 (noting that disparate treatment based on race or national origin is subject to
rigid scrutiny).
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is necessary to further a compelling government interest.52 Courts
only subject a race-based statute to strict scrutiny, however, where they
find proof of racial discrimination." If they fail to find proof of
discrimination, courts review the statute under the rational basis
standard.54
B. Proof of Racial Discrimination
The Supreme Court, in Washington v. Davis,55 set forth the "basic
equal protection principle" that the governmental action "claimed to
be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose."5" An invidious discriminatory purpose is
present where a statute discriminates on its face by creating, for
example, segregated facilities such as schools, rest rooms, and
drinking fountains. An invidious discriminatory purpose, however,
need not be expressed or appear on the face of the statute. 8 It can
be found where the government applies the statute so as to invidiously
discriminate on the basis of race.59 Additionally, an invidious
52. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993) (holding that North Carolina's
redistricting plan was unconstitutional attempt to segregate people to improve voting power);
see also Iijima, supra note 43, at 344-45 (stating that under strict scrutiny, governmental action
must have compelling purpose).
53. See infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text (discussing proof of racial discrimination).
54. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71
(1977) (upholding district court's finding that legislators were not motivated by racial
discrimination or intent to discriminate); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,246 (1976) (failing
to find proof of discrimination, Supreme Court found that legislative act in question was neutral
on its face and was rationally related to purpose government was constitutionally empowered to
pursue).
55. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
56. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). In Davis, the plaintiffs challenged a
police testing procedure in which four times more blacks than whites failed the test. Id. at 237.
The plaintiffs relied on this disproportionate impact for their equal protection challenge. Id.
The Supreme Court held that discriminatory intent was a prerequisite to a finding of an equal
protection violation. I& at 240.
57. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that "segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and
other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities").
58. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241.
59. l&; see, e.g., Ylck Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (finding government unfairly
applied local ordinance against Chinese). The Court stated:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. In Yick Wo, a San Francisco ordinance made it unlawful to operate a laundry in other than
a brick or stone building without obtaining the consent of the board of supervisors. Id. at 368.
Concluding that the ordinances were administered exclusively against Chinese, the Court held
that "whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied.. with
a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of... equal
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discriminatory purpose "may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts, including the fact... that the law bears more heavily
on one race than another."6°
In reaffirming the Davis standard, the Supreme Court, in Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney,61 stated that a facially neutral law, "even if [it]
has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority,... is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that
impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose" on the part of the
legislature.62  The Court noted that a discriminatory purpose
"implies that the legislature selected or reaffirmed a particular course
of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group."63
The Supreme Court further emphasized in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.' that Davis does not require
the person bringing an equal protection claim "to prove that the
challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes;"'
it need only be a "motivating factor."6 6  In deciding whether an
invidious discriminatory purpose is a motivating factor, courts must
make a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent as may be available."67 The district court in Clary listed the
"subjects of proper inquiry":
(1) adverse racial impact of the official action,
(2) historical background of the decisions,
(3) specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision,
(4) departures from normal procedure sequence,
(5) substantive departure from routine decisions,
(6) contemporary statements made by the decisionmakers, and
(7) the inevitability or foreseeability of the consequence of the
law.6u
protection." Id. at 373.
60. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242; see, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1985)
(determining that provision in Alabama Constitution disenfranchising persons convicted of
"crimes involving moral turpitude" violated Equal Protection Clause).
61. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
62. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
63. Id. at 279.
64. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
65. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Horw. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(emphasis added).
66. 1&t at 266; see also id. at 269-70 (upholding zoning board decision that tended to
perpetuate racially segregated housing patterns because, apart from iis disproportionate impact,
board's decision was shown to be application of constitutionally neutral zoning policy).
67. Id. at 266.
68. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 783 (E.D. Mo.) (citing Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 266-67, for factors one through five; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976), for
1995] 507
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:497
The Supreme Court specifically noted that these factors are not
exhaustive.
69
The crack statute does not discriminate on its face.7 ' As such, in
order for a court to find a racially discriminatory purpose, a defen-
dant challenging the crack statute must demonstrate either that the
government has applied the crack statute so as to invidiously
discriminate on the basis of race, or that a racially discriminatory
purpose should be inferred from the totality of relevant facts.71 No
court has struck down the crack statute based on the former
rationale, 72 but the district court in Clary found that the totality of
relevant facts demonstrated that race rather than conduct was a
motivating factor in enacting the crack statute.73
II. ENACTMENT OF THE CRACK STATUTE
America's concern with drugs is more than just a medical anxiety
related to overuse; it is, according to historian David Musto,74 a
political problem. 7' Lawmakers are generally concerned not so
much with the potential health dangers of drugs, but with the
violence and crime, whether real or imagined, often associated with
drugs.76 Apparently, it is this concern that led Congress to adopt
tougher laws to combat the crack cocaine "epidemic" of the mid-
1980s.
77
"Smoking" crack cocaine is a form of "freebasing" cocaine, which
means to inhale vapors of cocaine base.7' Crack is not, however,
sixth factor, and Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979), for seventh factor),
rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
69. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
70. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (iii) (1994) (declaring that "any person" convicted of
possession with intent to distribute 50 grams of crack shall be sentenced to no less than 10 years
in prison (emphasis added)).
71. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing methods of proving
discriminatory purpose).
72. But see Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 787 (implying that statistical evidence of racial disparity
may be enough to show intent to discriminate and thereby strike down crack statute under Yick
Wo analysis).
73. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 787.
74. See Michael Tonry, Toward a Rational Drug Policy: Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 37 (referring to David Musto as "the leading historian of American drug
policy").
75. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERCAN DISEASE: OIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 244 (1973).
76. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 559-60, 559 n.4 (arguing that legislators have
focused on crime and violence associated with use of drugs and have virtually ignored medical
aspects of problem).
77. powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 560.
78. James A. Inciardi, Beyond Cocaine: Basuco, Crack, and Other Coca Products, 14 CONTEMp.
DRUG PROBS. 461, 468-69 (1987). Inciardi notes that crack is technically not "smoked," it is
"inhaled." Id. at 489 n.21. Whereas smoking implies combustion, burning, and the inhalation
of smoke, crack, rather than burning, vaporizes and the fumes are inhaled. Id.
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"freebase" cocaine.79 To convert cocaine to its freebase form, an
alkali, such as ammonia or baking soda, is added to cocaine hydro-
chloride (powder cocaine) to remove the hydrochloric acid."0 The
free cocaine, or cocaine base (and hence the noun "freebase") is then
extracted with a flammable solvent, such as ether."' The result is a
crystalline form of cocaine which is then smoked in a special glass
pipe. 2 Thus, "freebase" is a drug, a cocaine product converted to
the base state after adulterants have been chemically removed, and
one inhales the vapors of the base through a process called
"freebasing."
83
Most Americans first heard about freebasing, popular since the
1970s, 4 when comedian Richard Pryor sustained third-degree burns
in 1980 when he accidentally ignited a container of ether while
converting cocaine to its freebase form. 5 This terrible accident
highlights the special danger of the freebase conversion process-the
proximity of highly flammable ether to an open flame. 6 Converting
powder cocaine to crack cocaine, however, provides an easier and
safer method than converting powder cocaine to freebase cocaine
because the process only requires water, baking soda, and a micro-
wave oven 7 and does not involve ether.' The person making
crack mixes powder cocaine with baking soda and water to create a
pastea8 and then heats this paste in a microwave to evaporate the
fluid." This process produces a pebble-sized crystalline form of
cocaine base91 which is then cut and smoked in a glass pipe. Thus,
crack, a cocaine product converted to the base state without removing
the adulterants, is a different form of cocaine than freebase co-
caine.92 Nevertheless, the chemical make-up of crack and freebase
79. 1d. at 468.
80. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 14 (statement of Charles R. Schuster, Ph.D.,
Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)); Inciardi, supra note 78, at 465.
81. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 14 (statement of Dr. Schuster); Inciardi, supra
note 78, at 465.
82. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 465.
83. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 468.
84. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at 465 (noting that freebasing began in 1970s and that, by
1977, as many as 10% of cocaine users were exclusively freebasers); Knoll D. Lowney, Smoked Not
Snorted:" Is Racism Inherent in Our Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 WASH. U.J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 121,
149 (1994) (stating that smoking only recently became popular means of ingesting cocaine).
85. Morganthau et al., supra note 11, at 58-59, reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. 4418 (1986).
86. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 466.
87. Lowney, supra note 84, at 149.
88. Morganthau et al., supra note 11, at 58, repinted in 132 CONG. REC. 4418 (1986).
89. Morganthau et al., supra note 11, at 59, reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 4418 (1986).
90. Lowney, supra note 84, at 149.
91. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 468. Crack gets its name from the crackling sound caused
by the residue of the baking soda when the substance is smoked. Id. at 469.
92. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 468.
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cocaine is virtually identical, and smoking either crack or freebase is
"essentially smoking cocaine."93
Although Congress was aware that crack cocaine was a new form of
freebasing cocaine rather than a new drug, 4 it enacted the crack
statute based on its conclusion that crack was more dangerous than
powder cocaine.95 Congress reached this conclusion after being
presented with evidence of crack's potency, its highly addictive nature,
its affordability, and its increasing prevalence." Additionally, mem-
bers of Congress felt that more crime accompanied crack than
powder cocaine.9
Senator Roth declared crack to be more potent than powdered
cocaine because crack, he claimed, is a purified form of cocaine.
98
Consequently, he reasoned, one gets a more rapid and intense rush
from smoking crack than snorting powder cocaine.99 Senator Chiles
likewise argued that crack is more potent than powder cocaine
because it is "purer" than powder cocaine." 0 He claimed that
because crack is purer, it reaches the brain in less than ten seconds,
while powder cocaine requires up to eight minutes to reach the
brain.
10 1
93. See Lowney, supra note 84, at 149-50 ("Examination of the chemical substance, pharma-
cology, and distribution of crack indicates that crack and powder cocaine are in fact not
substantially distinct drugs .... Despite the different modes of preparation, smoking crack...
is essentially smoking cocaine.").
94. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 71 (prepared statement of Dr. Charles 11
Schuster, Ph. D., Director, NIDA) (stating that "'crack' cocaine is a new form offeebase cocaine,
not a new drug" (emphasis added)). According to Inciardi, and as this Note has outlined, see
supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text, this statement is not technically accurate in that crack
is not freebase cocaine but is, rather, a form of freebasing cocaine. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at
468-69 (distinguishing"freebase" (noun) from "freebasing" (act)), Despite his misstatement that
crack was a form of freebase cocaine, Dr. Schuster correctly explained that crack was not a new
drug.
95. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 4 (statement of Sen. Nunn) (referring to
crack as "the most dangerous illicit drug that [law enforcement officials] have ever confronted").
96. SeeUnited States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768,791 (E.D. Mo.) (reviewing legislative history
of statute and suggesting that Congress accepted premises relating to crack's relative
dangerousness despite lack of "hard" or "reliable" evidence), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994),
cert. denieA, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
97. See Crack CocaineHearing, supra note 10, at 6 (prepared statement of Sen. Nunn) (stating
that law enforcement officials predict increase in crimes against persons and property as result
of crack cocaine).
98. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Roth). But see infra note
527 (citing Dr. Inciardi who explains that despite claims to contrary, crack is not purified
cocaine).
99. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Roth).
100. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 9 (prepared statement of Sen. Chiles).
101. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 9 (prepared statement of Sen. Chiles).
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Supporters of the crack statute also warned of crack's addictive-
ness.0 2 Senator Roth claimed that the intense rush resulting from
smoking crack is followed by an equally intense "crash" of severe
depression.10 3 Rather than being satisfied with one or two snorts of
powder cocaine, he argued, "[c]rack users demand multiple hits
immediately to offset the physical and psychological depression they
experience each time they crash.""' Senator Roth implied, there-
fore, that crack was more addictive than powder cocaine.
0 5
Advocates of the statute also asserted that the low cost of crack
contributed to its dangerousness. Dr. Charles R. Schuster, of the
National Institute on Drug Abuse, testified before Congress that
dealers had previously sold cocaine in lots of at least a gram for a
price around one hundred dollars, but sold crack in small vials for
around ten dollars each.' This packaging, Dr. Schuster stated,
"reduces the price barrier that prohibited young children from being
able to purchase the drug in the past."107 Senator Roth argued a
similar point, stating that because of its low cost, "crack is endanger-
ing the lives and futures of many people who previously would not
have had access to cocaine."108
To illustrate the increasing prevalence of crack, Senator Chiles
noted that in early 1985 he had never heard of crack cocaine.' 9
Senator Nunn added that later that year, "l[c] rack hit our society with
a suddenness unprecedented in the history of illicit drug use.""0
He referred to the introduction of crack into the drug scene as "an
overnight phenomenon.""' Dr. Schuster explained crack's popular-
102. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 5 (statement of Sen. Nunn) (asserting that
"crack is quite possibly the most addictive drug on Earth").
103. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Roth).
104. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Roth); see also id. at 8
(statement of Sen. Chiles) (discussing cocaine effects). Senator Chiles noted that the high of
crack is so high and the low is so low that the word on the street was "[d]on't smile at anybody
that you think might be on a cocaine low, because if you smile at him, he is liable to kill you.
He is liable to kill you because he is paranoid that he is in that kind of low." Id.
105. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Roth) (stating that crack
tends to be "extremely addictive"); see also 132 CONG. EC. 4412 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Hawkins) (quoting Arnold Washton, specialist at New Jersey's Fair Oaks Hospital). Washton
testified that "[c]rack is almost instantaneous addiction, whereas if you snort coke it can take
2 to 5 years before addiction sets in. There is no such thing as the recreational use of crack.
It is the most addictive drug known to man right now." Id. at 4412.
106. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 15 (statement of Dr. Schuster).
107. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 15 (statement of Dr. Schuster).
108. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Roth).
109. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 7 (statement of Sen. Chiles) (declaring that
"[e]ight months ago, I had never heard of crack cocaine").
110. Crack Cocaine Heaing, supra note 10, at 5 (statement of Sen. Nunn).
111. Crack CocaineHearing, supra note 10, at5 (statement of Sen. Nunn). But seeInciardi
supra note 64, at 468 (noting that crack has been around since early 1970s).
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ity, noting that it attracted first-time users because it did not require
the use of elaborate paraphernalia, it attracted younger and less
affluent customers because it sold at a low price, and it attracted
experienced users because it had a rapid effect."'
Additionally, at least one supporter of the crack statute cautioned
that crack accompanied a renewed traffic in stolen property and led
to an increase in crimes against persons."' Senator Nunn noted
reports indicating that, while dealers of powder cocaine do not barter
in stolen goods, crack dealers appear to accept stolen property as
payment." 4  Moreover, he argued that, unlike users of powder
cocaine (a substance which he claimed was less addictive than crack),
crack addicts will undoubtedly turn to burglaries and similar crimes
to support their habit."'
Based on this rationale, Congress feltjustified in enacting 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii), the so-called crack statute. Under this statute,
Congress effectively adopted a hundred-to-one ratio, treating one
gram of crack as equivalent to one hundred grams of powder cocaine
for sentencing purposes." 6 Edward Clary, an eighteen-year-old
black male with no prior criminal convictions, pleaded guilty to a
charge of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine under this
statute.11
7
III. UNITE STATES V. CLARY
Edward Clary was arrested and charged with possession with intent
to distribute 67.76 grams of crack cocaine."' Clary entered a guilty
plea to the charge, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii), which
imposes a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence." 9 After he
pleaded guilty, but before sentencing, Clary filed a motion arguing
that the ten-year mandatory minimum in § 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii) 20 and
112. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 15 (statement of Dr. Schuster).
113. Crack ocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 6 (prepared statement of Sen. Nunn).
114. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 6 (prepared statement of Sen. Nunn) (stating
that police have found stolen property during raids of crack houses).
115. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 6 (prepared statement of Sen. Nunn)
(declaring that "[p] olice are anticipating an increase in burglaries and similar violations as crack
use spreads").
116. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (1994). While the minimum 10 year sentence
applies to a person convicted of possessing just 50 grams of "a mixture or substance.. . which
contains cocaine base," id. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii), this penalty only applies to possessors of powder
cocaine if the amount is five kilograms or more, id. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (ii) (II).
117. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 797 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct 1172 (1995).
118. Id. at 769-70.
119. Id. at 770.
120. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994).
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in the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2Dl.1l12
violated his Fifth Amendment equal protection rights. District
courtJudge Cahill concluded that the sizable disparity in the penalties
for crack and powder cocaine possession did in fact violate the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
both generally and as applied.23  The Eighth Circuit reversed this
decision on appeal. 24
A. District Court Decision
The Eighth Circuit has consistently upheld the constitutionality of
the disparate treatment of powder cocaine and crack for sentencing
purposes." In United States v. Marshal426 however, the Eighth
121. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 18, § 2Dl.1, at 79.
122. Claiy, 846 F. Supp. at 770. The district court consolidated the separate challenges to
U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a) (3) and (c) (13) and to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) (1) (A) (iii) and (ii) (II) because
the guidelines are simply the direct implementation of the statutory directive. Id. at 770 n.2.
This Note does so as well.
123. Claiy, 846 F. Supp. at 797. The district court also held that the selective prosecution
of crack cases on the basis of race was constitutionally impermissible as applied to Clary. Id.
Clary conceded before the Eighth Circuit, however, that, in the district court, he "'did not claim
that he was selectively prosecuted because of his race ... [because he] was mindful of the even
more difficult burden of proof he would have had to carry."' United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709,
714 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting
Appellee's Brief at 43). The Eighth Circuit, therefore, rejected the claim of selective
prosecution, id., and this Note does not contest this issue.
124. Clary, 34 F.3d at 709.
125. See, eg., United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389, 1396-97 (8th Cir.) (rejecting equal
protection challenge to more severe crack penalties because there was no evidence to suggest
that Congress permitted them to remain in effect to further racially discriminatory purpose),
cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994); United States v. Simms, 18 F.3d 588, 595 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that hundred-to-one disparity in sentencing guidelines between crack and powder
cocaine offenses did not violate due process or equal protection rights); United States v. Parris,
17 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir.) (rejecting equal protection challenge based on alleged disparate
racial impact resulting from stricter penalties for crack versus powder cocaine), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1662 (1994); United States v. Johnson, 12 F.3d 760, 763-64 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
constitutional challenges to more severe sentences for crack cocaine and restating that
.requiring more severe penalties for cocaine-base offenses than for cocaine-powder offenses is
'rationally related to Congress' objective of protecting the public welfare'" (quoting United
States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 1990))), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2689 (1994); United
States v. Echols, 2 F.3d 849, 850 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (refusing to reconsider previous
holding that Sentencing Guidelines' disparate treatment of crack cocaine and powder cocaine
did not violate equal protection); United States v. Womack, 985 F.2d 395, 400-01 (8th Cir.)
(rejecting claim that different sentences imposed for distribution of crack and powder cocaine
violated equal protection and relying on previous cases as conclusive resolution of issue), cert.
denie, 114 S. Ct. 276 (1993); United States v. Williams, 982 F.2d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1992)
(reaffirming previous holdings that hundred-to-one ratio does not violate equal protection or
due process, yet failing to address apparent statistical proof of disparate racial impact); United
States v. Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 974-76 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting due process challenge and
equal protection challenge on ground of disparate impact due to absence of evidence that
Congress or Sentencing Commission had racially discriminatory motive), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1819 (1993); United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1225-26 (8th Cir. 1992) (declining to
reconsider previous holdings that hundred-to-one ratio did not violate equal protection even
though Minnesota Supreme Court had recently found that similar state statute violated equal
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Circuit suggested that it would reconsider the issue if presented with
"new facts or legal analysis." 27 In Clary, the district court accepted
this invitation by entertaining Edward Clary's equal protection chal-
lenge. 2 ' The district court rejected the argument that overt racism
was the basis for the crack penalties. 2 Instead, it relied on uncon-
scious racism'3° and the rules announced in Arlington Heights' to
conclude that Congress' "failure to account for a foreseeable disparate
impact which would effect [sic] black Americans in grossly dispropor-
protection clause of state constitution in State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991)); United
States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 767 (8th Cir.) (rejecting, "without lengthy discussion" and with
strong regard for stare de&isis, due process challenge, equal protection challenge, and Eighth
Amendment challenge to hundred-to-one ratio, thereby effectively ignoring assertions that 97%
of those charged with crack offenses in Western District of Missouri in 1988-89 were black), cert.
denied 113 S. Ct. 632 (1992); United States v. Hechavarria, 960 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1992)
(per curiam) (noting that prior cases already rejected defendant's argument that imposing
harsher sentences foruse or distribution of crackviolated defendant's right to equal protection);
United States v. McDile, 946 F.2d 1330, 1331 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting previous holding that crack
statute did not violate equal protection rights); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 408-09
(8th Cir.) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to crack statute), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 646
(1991); United States v. House, 939 F.2d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that hundred-to-one
ratio did not violate equal protection or Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and usual
punishment); United States v. Winfrey, 900 F.2d 1225, 1227 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
substantive due process and Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges); United States v.
Reed, 897 F.2d 351, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (upholding constitutional validity of
hundred-to-one ratio against equal protection challenge on authority of previous case rejecting
substantive due process challenge); United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 978-81 (8th Cir.
1990) (rejecting substantive due process and Eighth Amendment attacks on hundred-to-one
ratio and holding that crack penalties are rationally related to legitimate congressional objective
of protecting public against highly potent and addictive nature of crack).
Other courts have viewed the issue differently. See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 857 F.
Supp. 105, 111-12 (D.D.C. 1994) (refusing to impose mandatory minimum where defendant was
prepared to sell powder cocaine to undercover officer but, upon officer's insistence that she first
convert powder to crack, defendant instead sold crack after "cooking" powder in microwave);
United States v. Walls, 841 F. Supp. 24, 31-33 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that enhanced penalties
for crack offenses, as applied to two defendants who were drug addicts employed by other
defendants for minimal compensation to convert powder cocaine to crack, constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment); State v, Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889
(Minn. 1991) (holding Minnesota crack statute to be unconstitutional under state equal
protection challenge in which court applied rational basis test as articulated by Minnesota law).
126. 998 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1993).
127. United States v. Marshall, 998 F.2d 634,635 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993) ("With so much at stake
... we are reluctant to say that full exploration of the issues is unwarranted,... in connection
with the crack cocaine punishments, which continue to perplex many sentencing judges. We
do not invite mere repetition of prior rejected arguments, without new facts or legal- analysis.").
128. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 771 (E.D. Mo.), retld, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994), c-ert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
129. See id. at 779 ("When counsel first argued that overt racism was really the basis for the
discriminatory crack penalties, this Court rejected that approach out-of-hand .... But upon
reflection, the Court recognizes that while intentional discrimination is unlikely today,
unconscious feelings of difference and superiority still live on even in well-intentioned minds,").
130. See infra Part IV (discussing unconscious racism); supra note 129 (citing language in
Clary describing unconscious racism).
131. Seesupranotes 64-69 and accompanying text (discussing rules guiding inquiry into role
of invidious discrimination in passage of statute).
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donate numbers would .. .violate the spirit and letter of equal
protection."' 2
The court stated that "the root of racism has been implanted in our
collective unconscious and has biased the ideas that Americans accept
about the significance of race." 3 After beginning its analysis with
a description of the history of racism in criminal punishment,"M the
court went on to outline the events leading up to the passage of the
crack statute.13 The court acknowledged numerous media accounts
associating crack with blacks.' Moreover, the court showed that
Congress exploited these media accounts to support enactment of the
crack statute. 3 7
The court also pointed to departures from normal procedures in
approving the crack sentencing provisions."s  For example, the
House held few hearings on the enhanced penalty provisions for
crack offenders, 139 and the Senate only conducted a single morning
hearing on the matter."4 In addition, although Congress originally
called for a fifty-to-one ratio in the penalties, it later doubled them for
no other reason than to symbolize "redoubled Congressional
seriousness."' 4 '
The court also acknowledged the adverse racial impact of the crack
statute and the degree to which Congress should have foreseen these
consequences.'4 The court stated that, based on the "legions" of
media reports depicting heavy involvement by blacks in crack cocaine,
it was foreseeable that the harsh penalties would disproportionately
affect blacks. Moreover, the court found undisputed evidence
that blacks, in fact, constituted 98.2% of persons convicted of crack
cocaine charges in the Eastern District of Missouri between the years
1988 and 1992."M The court observed that nationally, blacks made
132. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 782.
133. Id. at 778-79.
134. I at 774-76.
135. See i&. at 776-78 (discussing racism from 1860s onward and impact of 1980s on black
community).
136. I& at 783-84.
137. See id. at 783-84 ("Legislators used these media accounts as informational support for
the enactment of the crack statute .... Members of Congress also introduced into the record
media reports containing language thatwas eitherovertly orsubtly racist, andwhich exacerbated
white fears that the 'crack problem' would spill out of the ghettos.").
138. Id. at 784-85.
139. l& at 784.
140. 1&. at 784-85 ("Tossing caution to the wind, the Senate conducted a single hearing
between 9:40 a.m. and 1:15 p.m., including recesses. Attendance was intermittent.").
141. Id. at 784.
142. l1. at 785-87.
143. l1& at 785.
144. 1&t at 786.
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up 92.6% of those convicted of crack cocaine charges in 1992."'
Accordingly, the court concluded that "[o]bjective evidence supports
the belief that racial animus was a motivating factor in enacting the
crack statute."' 46
Having thus found race rather than conduct to be the target of the
enhanced penalties for crack offenses, the district court applied strict
scrutiny to review the crack statute. 47 The court failed to find a
compelling governmental interest, questioning several of Congress'
conclusions: that crack was one hundred times more potent than
powder cocaine,"18 that it was more addictive,149 that it was more
affordable,'5 ° and that it was more prevalent.'' The court then
determined that even if Congress had compelling interests, Congress
failed to draft the crack statute in narrow terms to accomplish those
interests. 52  The court stressed that "[c]ocaine is cocaine." 5 '
Accordingly, the district court held 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii) to
be unconstitutional in the face of Clary's equal protection chal-
lenge.- 4  The government appealed this decision to the Eighth
Circuit."
B. Eighth Circuit Decision
The Eighth Circuit, stating that past decisions had repeatedly
decided this issue,156 found no equal protection violation and
145. Id.
146. Id. at 787; see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977) (stating that challenged action need not rest solely on racially discriminatory
purpose as long as proof exists that discriminatory purpose has been motivating factor).
147. See Claty, 846 F. Supp. at 791 (explaining that "[a] law which burdens blacks
disproportionately and whose influence has been traced to racial considerations, even if
unconscious, warrants the most rigorous scrutiny"). A law with such disproportionate impact
will survive strict scrutiny "only if the classification which is suspect is narrowly tailored to further
a compelling governmental interest." Id.
148. See id. (stating that "Congress had no hard evidence before it to support the contentions
that crack was 100 times more potent or dangerous than powder cocaine").
149. See id. at 792 (finding that Congress had "no reliable evidence... that crack cocaine
was more addictive or dangerous than powder cocaine").
150. See id. (claiming that "[c ] rack is no cheaper than cocaine powder because cocaine is the
essential product of crack").
151. See id. (stating that "[a]U forms of cocaine are available today in greater quantity and
at lower prices than a few years ago").
152. Id at 793.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 797.
155. United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
156. See supra note 125 (listing Eighth Circuit cases rejecting constitutional challenges to
crack statute). The Eighth Circuit looked primarily to three past decisions in finding that there
was no equal protection violation. Ctary, 34 F.3d at 712-13. The court noted that, in United
States v. Lattimore it had previously "concluded that there was no evidence that Congress or the
Sentencing Commission had a racially discriminatory motive when it crafted the Guidelines with
extended sentences for crack cocaine." Claqy, 34 F.3d at 712 (citing United States v. Lattimore,
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reversed the district court's decision.'57 The Eighth Circuit noted
that the district court's "painstakingly-crafted" opinion "undoubtedly
presents the most complete record on this issue." 5' Nevertheless,
the court concluded that a review of the record and the lower court's
findings failed to demonstrate a congressional intent to act with a
discriminatory purpose when passing the crack statute, or that
Congress chose this type of action "at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'5 9
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by questioning the district
court's reliance on unconscious racism and its conclusion that the
media-created stereotypes of blacks as crack dealers "undoubtedly"
influenced Congress' racial perceptions.1"° Unconscious racism, the
Eighth Circuit flatly concluded, "simply does not address the question
whether Congress acted with a discriminatory purpose." 6' Addition-
ally, while recognizing that the media-created stereotypes might have
affected some members of Congress, the Eighth Circuit felt that
influencing some legislators "hardly demonstrate [s]" that Congress
enacted the crack statute "because of its adverse effect on African
American males, instead of its stated purpose of responding to the
serious impact of a rapidly-developing and particularly-dangerous form
of drug use."'62
The Eighth Circuit also countered the district court's proof of
invidious discriminatory purpose under the Arlington Heights fac-
tors.1' The court accounted for Congress' haste in approving the
crack sentencing provisions by noting the seriousness of the perceived
problem." The court also declared that objective evidence reveal-
ing the disproportionate racial impact of the crack statute is not
enough to establish invidious intent "because the Equal Protection
Clause is violated 'only if that impact can be traced to a discriminato-
974 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1819 (1993)). In United States v. Buckner,
the Eighth Circuit "held that requiring more severe penalties for crack than cocaine powder was
not arbitrary or irrational." Clary, 34 M.d at 712 (citing United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975,
980 (8th Cir. 1990)). In United States v. Maxwell it "rejected a strict scrutiny argument that was
based on the continued enforcement of the statute rather than its enactment." Clary, 34 F.3d
at 713 (citing United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389, 1396-97 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
610 (1994)).
157. Clary, 34 F.3d at 713.
158. Id.





163. See supra text accompanying note 68 (listing Arlington Heights factors).
164. Clary, 34 F.3d at 713.
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ry purpose.'"" Failing to find proof of racial animus,"t the
Eighth Circuit applied rational basis review and upheld the crack
statute as constitutional.1 67
IV. UNCONSCIOUS RACISM
Acceptance of unconscious racial animus distinguished the district
court's opinion from that of the Eighth Circuit. The former
recognized that a current equal protection analysis must consider the
unconscious predisposition of legislators." The latter rejected that
theory, finding that it failed to address the central issue of whether
Congress acted with a discriminatory purpose. 169 An exploration of
unconscious racism is therefore required to determine whether it
should be considered in an equal protection challenge to the crack
statute.
A. Unconscious Racism Explained
According to Professor Charles Lawrence, racism is a disease that
infects almost everyone, yet most of us remain unaware that we take
race into account in our decisionmaking.1 7° Racism, according to
Lawrence, "is a set of beliefs whereby we irrationally attach signifi-
cance to something called race.""' Racism infects most Americans
because we "share a common historical and cultural heritage iii which
racism has played and still plays a dominant role."17  At the same
time, even though most of us do not consciously engage in overt
discrimination,'73 we often are unaware of the ways in which our
165. Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
166. Claiy, 34 F.3d at 713. The Eighth Circuit looked to the testimony of Eric E. Sterling,
Counsel to the Subcommittee of Criminal Justice of the House of Representatives at the time
Congress passed the crack statute, and attempted to distinguish "racial animus" from "racial
consciousness," i.e., "an awareness that the problem in the inner cities... was about to explode
into the white part of the country." Id at 714. The Eighth Circuit felt that although Congress
recognized that primarily minorities used crack, the crack statute was constitutional because
Congress wanted the penalties to apply wherever dealers sold crack. I&
167. See id. at 712-13 (noting previous holdings finding rational motives for heavier penalties
for crack).
168. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 782 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denieA, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
169. Clary, 34 F.3d at 713.
170. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racim, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321-22 (1987) (outlining basic theory of unconscious
racism).
171. 1& at 330.
172. Id at 322.
173. Overt discrimination against blacks has become increasingly unacceptable and, in some
instances, illegal. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954) (holding that de
jure school segregation based on race, "even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible'
factors may be equal, deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal educational
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common experience influences our beliefs about race or when those
beliefs affect our actions. 74  Consequently, Lawrence argues,
unconscious racial motivation influences much of the behavior that
produces racial discrimination.
175
Lawrence offers two explanations for unconscious racism, the
Freudian theory and the cognitive theory. The Freudian theory holds
that the "mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by
denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that
conflict with what the individual has learned is good or right.""7 6
Even though American society has recently rejected racism as
immoral, our common historical experience makes it a part of our
culture." 7 Freudian theorists argue that when a person's racist
ideas conflict with a society that condemns those ideas, the mind
excludes racism from the consciousness,"8 forcing it into the
unconscious mind.
7 9
Alternatively, the cognitive theory states that our culture transmits
certain beliefs and preferences through, among others, family, peers,
and the media.' These beliefs are so much a part of the culture
that, according to Lawrence, we internalize them without explicit
knowledge.' Instead, he argues, these beliefs are "part of the
individual's rational ordering of her perceptions of the world.""s2
Cognitive theorists argue that perceiving blacks as dangerous or
opportunities"). Although the Supreme Court limited its holding in Brown to school
segregation, Brown marked the beginning of the end of the entire system of separate but equal.
In a series of per curiam decisions, the Court extended its ruling in Brown to other public
facilities, such as parks, New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (per curiam), affig 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), public transportation, Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam), affgl42 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), golf courses, Holmes v. Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955), re'g 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), and bath houses and beaches, Mayor & City
Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), aftg220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.).
174. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 322. For examples of unconscious racism in everyday life,
see i& at 339 (noting that Howard Cosell (white sportscaster) referred to Alvin Garrett (black
athlete) as "little monkey"); id. at 340 (noting how former First Lady Nancy Reagan told Ronald
Reagan's supporters she wished he were there to "see all these beautiful white people"); id at
341 (discussing how some white people express their acceptance of individual blacks by stating
that they "do not think of them as black").
175. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 322.
176. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 322.
177. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 322-23 (discussing integral part racism has played in
American history, despite recent conclusion that racism is immoral).
178. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 323 (contrasting dichotomy of racism as socially
unacceptable today with reality of past racism).
179. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 780-81 (E.D. Mo.) (discussing Freudian
theory and its relation to covert racism in form of subconscious stereotyping), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709
(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
180. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 323.
181. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 323 (discussing embedded cultural beliefs).
182. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 323.
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inferior is learned and internalized completely outside the conscious-
ness, and is reinforced by media-generated stereotypes of blacks.l
83
Regardless of the theory, however, the result is that we take race
into account even though we often are not cognizant that we are
doing so or without considering why we place so much emphasis on
race in the first place.'8
B. Unconscious Racism and Equal Protection
Requiring proof of a conscious or intentional discriminatory
purpose in an equal protection challenge, Lawrence argues, ignores
not only much of what we understand about the workings of the
human mind, but also the history of race in our society.185  Law-
rence states:
Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions
about racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can
be characterized as neither intentional-in the sense that certain
outcomes are self-consciously sought-nor unintentional-in the
sense that the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced
by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires, and wishes.'
Acknowledging unconscious racism in an equal protection analysis,
however, helps to eliminate governmental decisions that consider race
without substantial justification. 7 Unconscious racism, in other
words, helps to correct the wrong we seek to address in applying
heightened scrutiny to racial classifications.1
8 8
183. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 780.
184. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 330. The district court in Clary recognized that "while
intentional discrimination is unlikely today, unconscious feelings of difference and superiority
still live on even in well-intentioned minds." 846 F. Supp. at 779. For example, the white
community might mask a decision which disproportionately affects blacks by arguing that it is
for the "greater good" of society. Id. Or police might argue that they are protecting black
neighborhoods and black citizens by "using harsh 'get tough' laws to arrest crack dealers." Id.
185. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 323.
186. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 322 (citations omitted).
187. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 323.
188. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 344 (explaining why unconscious racism is relevant to
equal protection analysis). Lawrence states:
What is the wrong that the equal protection clause seeks to address? More specifically,
what wrong do we seek to address in applying heightened scrutiny to racial classifica-
tions? If we can determine the nature of this wrong, we can determine whether
identifying the existence of unconscious racial motivation is important to its prevention
or remediation.
520
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1. Justification for the suspect classification doctrine
Two theories justify the suspect classification doctrine.19  The
first, the "process defect" theory, asserts that judicial intervention
seeks to prevent or remedy "the systematic exclusion of a group from
the normal workings of the political process." 19 To state it differ-
ently, courts should protect those who have not been able to protect
themselves through the democratic process.'9 ' The process defect
theory applies strict scrutiny to uncover unconstitutional motive by
questioning those classifications that disadvantage "discrete and
insular" minorities.
1 92
The second, the "stigma" theory, holds that judicial intervention
seeks to prevent or remedy racially stigmatizing actions." 3 The
stigma theory applies strict scrutiny to racial classifications when "they
operate to shame and degrade a class of persons by labeling them as
inferior."194 This theory looks to the impact of a particular govern-
mental action on a minority and presumes that the harm flows from
the "governmental action taken with intent to stigmatize. ""' The
stigma theory recognizes that whites historically have used stigmatizing
labels against blacks and have developed a proscribed method of legal
189. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 344.
190. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 344-45. John Hart Ely is the main proponent of the
process defect theory. SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL
REviEv 135-79 (1980) (outlining process defect theory).
191. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 345. This theory has its origins in the famous foomote 4
in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., in which Justice Stone suggested that there should be
additional protection for "discrete and insular" minorities. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
192. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 349 (stating that "(tlhe process defect theory sees
suspect classification doctrine as a roundabout way of uncovering unconstitutional motive by
suspecting those classifications that disadvantage groups we know to be the object of widespread
vilification").
193. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 349-50. Lawrence defines "stigmatization" as "the process
by which the dominant group in society differentiates itself from others by setting them apart,
treating them as less than fully human, denying them acceptance by the organized community,
and excluding them from participating in that community as equals." Id. at 350.
194. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 350 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
361-62 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justice Harlan, in his
dissent in P/ersy v. Ferguson, gave rise to this theory when he referred to the segregation of
railway passengers as a "badge of servitude" which proceeded "on the ground that colored
citizens are... inferior and degraded." 163 U.S. 537, 560, 562 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting);
see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 560 (1954) (finding segregated educational
facilities violate equal protection); Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,257 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("Our pointed focus in [Brown v. Board of Educ.] upon the stigmatic injury caused
by segregated schools explains our unflagging insistence that formerly dejure segregated school
districts extinguish all vestiges of school segregation.").
195. Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the CureforDe jure Segregation to Replicate the
Disease, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 4, 51 (1992) (discussing application of stigmatic theory to school
desegregation cases).
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and cultural practices that treat blacks as inferior when compared
with treatment of whites.196
Governmental motive and disproportionate impact in cases alleging
racial discrimination, however, are not mutually exclusive. 97 In
order to carry out the goals behind the process defect theory, courts
cannot stop at only those laws that discriminate on their face or are
the result of overt racism. 9 ' "Unconscious aversion to a group that
has historically been vilified distorts the political process no less than
a conscious decision to place race hatred before politically legitimate
goals."'" Because process distortion exists where racial prejudice
has influenced the decision, it is irrelevant that legislators' motives lie
outside their awareness.
200
Similarly, a law does not stigmatize blacks merely because it
disproportionately affects blacks; instead, the stigma must stem from
society's predisposition to exclude blacks.20 1 "If stigmatizing actions
injure by virtue of the meaning society gives them, then it should be
apparent that the evil intent of their authors, while perhaps sufficient,
is not necessary to the infliction of the injury."2 2 Stigma can occur,
therefore, even if those who participate in the stigmatizing action
have seemingly benign motives.03
196. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 350; see Brown, supra note 195, at 66 (claiming that
constitutional harm of segregation is not racial imbalance per se, but meaning attached to it);
Charles R. Lawrence III, Segregation "Misunderstood" The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L.
REv. 15, 26 (1977) (asserting that de jure segregation is "public symbol of the inferior position"
of African-Americans).
197. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 321-22 (discussing reasons for unconscious racism in
relation to governmental motive and disproportionate impact).
198. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 349 (arguing that courts must assess subtletiesof
legislation to determine whether law may have racist implications not apparent in plain
meaning).
199. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 349.
200. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 347; see LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16-21, at 1519 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing effect of covert racism on minority groups).
Tribe states:
If government is barred from enacting laws with an eye to invidious discrimination
against a particular group, it should not be free to visit the same wrong whenever it
happens to be looking the other way. If a state may not club minorities with its fist,
surely it may not indifferently inflict the same wound with the back of its hand.
Id.
201. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 354 (pointing out that due to their lower net incomes,
blacks are disproportionately affected by bridge tolls, sales tax, and filing fees, which do not
necessarily racially stigmatize blacks).
202. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 352. Lawrence argues that "when the city of Jackson,
Mississippi, closed its public pools after a federal court ordered it to integrate them, [the act]
stigmatized blacks regardless of whether the (motive was) racial or economic." Id. at 352-53
(discussing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971)).
203. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 354.
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2. Cultural meaning test
Lawrence has proposed a "cultural meaning" test for recognizing
racial discrimination.2  This test suggests a connection between
unconscious racism and the existence of cultural symbols to which
society attaches racial meaning."' In applying the cultural meaning
test, courts would consider evidence of the social and historical
context in which legislators made the alleged discriminatory deci-
sion.0 6
The equal protection analysis evaluates governmental action "to see
if it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial
significance."2 "7 If the court determines that the society views the
governmental action in terms of race, then, according to Lawrence,
it must also find racial considerations in the beliefs and motivations
of the legislators.08 Lawrence reasons that "[t]he actors are them-
selves part of the culture and presumably could not have acted
without being influenced by racial considerations, even if they are
unaware of their racist beliefs."" 9 Accordingly, if the court deter-
mines that the actions were race-based, it applies strict scrutiny.
210
Lawrence illustrates his cultural meaning test by looking at Memphis
v. Greene"' and other well-known discrimination cases. 2  In
Greene, the city of Memphis closed a street between black and white
neighborhoods at the request of the citizens of Hein Park, a white
residential community." The Supreme Court, while noting that
the adverse impact on blacks was greater than on whites because the
street was primarily used by blacks, failed to find proof of racial
discrimination. 4 Consequently, the Court found no constitutional
204. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 355-58.
205. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 324.
206. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 356.
207. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 356.
208. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 356 (arguing that if court determines that society
"thinks of governmental action in racial terms, then it would presume that socially shared,
unconscious racial attitudes made evident by the action's meaning had influenced the
decisionmakers").
209. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 324.
210. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 356 (proposing that "[t]he court would analyze
governmental behavior much like a cultural anthropologist might: by considering evidence
regarding the historical and social context in which the decision was made and effectuated").
211. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
212. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 357-58, 363-64 (applying cultural meaning test to
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981)); see also id. at 362-76 (applying cultural meaning test
to Brown v. Board of Educ., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., and Washington v.
Davis).
213. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 102-03 (1981).
214. See id. at 113-16, 119 (reasoning that city's decision to close street was motivated by its
interest in protecting safety and tranquility of residential neighborhood).
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violation."5 Lawrence, however, argues that the construction of the
barrier between the neighborhoods has cultural meaning because it
reflects "a long history of whites' desire to separate themselves from
blacks as a symbol of their superiority."216 Presumably, in weighing
the social and historical context in which the chosen course of action
was taken, a court would find purposeful discrimination on the part
of the decisionmakers and would apply strict scrutiny."
Similarly, in Arlington Heights, a nonprofit development corporation
planned to develop racially integrated low- and moderate-income
federally subsidized housing in a predominantly white Chicago
suburb.21 The proposed site, however, was zoned for single family
dwellings.219 The development corporation, therefore, petitioned
the village to rezone the property for multiple family use.22° The
village board of trustees denied the rezoning request and the
developer, along with three prospective black tenants, brought suit
alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory.22' The Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the village acted with
discriminatory purpose.2
Lawrence reasons that the plaintiffs should have been able to
present evidence to illustrate that denying the rezoning request
conveys a cultural message that denigrates blacks.223  This evidence
includes "the history of statutorily mandated housing segregation as
well as the use of restrictive covenants among private parties that aim
to prevent blacks from purchasing property in white neighbor-
215. See id at 126 (finding no racially discriminatory motive on part of legislature, Court
concluded that disparate impact on black citizens "could not.., be fairly characterized as a
badge or incident ofslavery"); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (finding that
preclusion of blacks from public accommodations did not violate Thirteenth Amendment and
was not "badge and incident of slavery").
216. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 357. Lawrence asks:
What does it mean to construct a barrier between all-white and all-black sections of
Memphis? In a city where just twenty years ago such barriers were built down the
middle of rest rooms and restaurants with signs on them that read "white" and
"colored," won't there be considerable consensus as to whether the barrier speaks in
racial terms? Won't there be a cultural memory that gives the barrier the same
meaning even in the absence of the now-outlawed signs? Is it possible that a council
member in this city would not have remembered the message conveyed by those earlier
barriers when he voted to construct the present one? I think it is impossible.
Id. at 364 (citations omitted).
217. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 356 (noting that court would apply strict scrutiny upon
finding that significant portion of society thinks of governmental action in racial terms).
218. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 252 (1977).
219. Id at 255.
220. Id at 257.
221. Id. at 258.
222. Id. at 270.
223. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 366.
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hoods."224 Lawrence recognizes that we have rarely come to live in
segregated neighborhoods because of mutual choice; rather, we live
in segregated communities because whites believe in their own
superiority, and living in close proximity to blacks "lowers their own
status. 225 Lawrence concludes that the available evidence highlights
our society's frequent attachment of racial meaning to segregated
housing and is "more than sufficient to establish the cultural meaning
of the Arlington Heights city officials' action."226
Racial meaning is given to governmental action, however, only
when society as a whole, including both whites and blacks, attaches
racial significance to the action.227 An increase in sales tax may
disproportionately impact blacks because blacks as a group have a
lower net income than whites.22 But our culture does not associate
a decision to raise taxes in racial terms.229 We think of a tax
increase as an economic decision.2" "Where the culture as a whole
does not think of an action in racial terms, it is also unlikely that
unconscious attitudes about race influenced the governmental
decisionmaker."23' Simply put, the racial meaning behind these
decisions is not widely understood within the predominant cul-
ture.232 In these cases, therefore, the court would presume that the
actions were not race-based and would apply the rational basis
standard.233
Lawrence asserts that his cultural meaning test for recognizing
racial discrimination is "relatively modest."21 It does not, he argues,
preclude the search for unconstitutional motives or suggest that all
governmental action resulting in discriminatory impact be subject to
strict scrutiny.3 5 Instead, it requires courts to understand "the
224. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 366.
225. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 367.
226. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 367.
227. SeeLawrence, supra note 170, at 379 (arguing that because United States does not have
homogenous culture, courts generally should recognize racial meaning only when racial
meaning is widely recognized throughout predominant culture).
228. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 364 (recognizing that blacks are disproportionately
represented among poor).
229. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 365.
230. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 365.
231. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 365.
232. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 379 (stating that racial meaning must be shared by
society as a whole).
233. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 324 (noting that court would apply strict scrutiny only
where it finds evidence of invidious purpose).
234. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 324.
235. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 324.
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nature of human motivation."216  While the focus remains on
individual responsibility, Lawrence's test emphasizes individual
responsibility in the broader historical and social context.
2 7
Supreme Court justices and lower federal court judges agree that
unconscious racism plays a part in decisionmaking and have used
Lawrence's theory in their analyses of equal protection challenges,2.
As such, the Eighth Circuit erred in refusing to consider unconscious
racism in its examination of the crack statute under Clary's equal
protection challenge.3 9
C. Unconscious Racism and the Crack Statute
Under Lawrence's unconscious racism theory, evidence of the
cultural meaning of Congress' action in enacting the crack statute
must be considered in light of the historical use of related actions and
the contemporaneous meaning of such actions to our culture. 240 As
in Arlington Heights, in which Lawrence suggests the plaintiffs should
have been able to present evidence of the historical and contempora-
neous meaning of residential segregation, a plaintiff challenging the
crack statute should be able to present evidence of our society's
frequent attachment of racial meaning to crime and drug abuse.241
Such an analysis begins with the issue of whether our country has a
236. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 324. Lawrence recognizes that some legal scholars
question the utility of social science and the ability of courts to interpret the meaning of human
behavior. Md at 358. He distinguishes, however, between causal and interpretive judgments in
determining the meaning behind a particular action. Id at 361. He states that "causal
judgments assert a causal connection between two independently specifiable social phenomena.
An interpretive judgment, on the other hand, locates a particular phenomenon within a
category of phenomena by specifying its meaning in the society within which it occurs." M.
Lawrence continues:
To say that we don't need evidence for the proposition that segregation is an insult to
the black community is not to say that we don't need to know it or that there is
nothing to know. "There is a fact of the matter, namely that segregation is an insult,
but we need no evidence for that fact-we just know it. It's an interpretive fact." ,
Id. (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights: The Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6J.L. & EDuc. 3, 5 (1977)). It is this type of interpretive judgment on which Brown
v. Board of Educ. rested. Id. at 361. Lawrence claims that the cultural meaning test also requires
this type of interpretive judgment. Id.
237. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 324.
238. See infra notes 443-44 and accompanying text (noting cases in which unconscious racism
has been used in equal protection challenges).
239. See infra notes 443-50 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why courts should
consider unconscious racism).
240. SeeLawrence, supra note 170, at 356 ("The court would analyze governmental behavior
much like a cultural anthropologist might by considering evidence regarding the historical and
social context in which the decision was made and effectuated.").
241. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (discussing historical and contemporary
relevance of racial meaning in Arlington Heights).
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history of associating crime with race.2' Next, the question be-
comes whether our country has a history of attaching racial signifi-
cance to certain drugs.24' Finally, the analysis asks whether there
was widespread public association of crack with race at the -time
Congress provided the enhanced penalty provisions for crack
cocaine,2u If there is a historical use of such actions and if the
culture thinks of the governmental action in racial terms, then,
according to Lawrence's theory, we must also find racial consider-
ations in the beliefs and motivations of the legislators. 4
1. History of associating crime with race
The relationship between crime and race has existed since America
was first settled.246 By the end of the seventeenth century, whites
had provided enhanced penalties for blacks convicted of certain
crimes, and criminalized certain noncriminal activity when blacks were
involved.247  The criminalization of race continued throughout the
colonial and antebellum periods, through Reconstruction, and into
the twentieth century.24 As late as 1967, in fact, the Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutional a law that criminalized conduct based
solely on the race of the defendants.249
a. Colonial and antebellum periods
The first Africans arrived in Virginia in 1619." ° While the status
242. See infra notes 246-350 and accompanying text (analyzing our country's frequent
association of crime and race); see also Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2063,
2064 (1993) (arguing that "[t]o understand the modem relationship between race and criminal
law one must study the historic connection between defining crime, criminal law, and race").
243. See infra notes 351-85 and accompanying text (considering racial connotations of certain
drugs).
244. See infra notes 386-433 and accompanying text (discussing racial meaning given to crack
cocaine by predominant culture ).
245. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 356 (arguing that once court is satisfied that substantial
part of population thinks of governmental decision in racial terms, court should "presume that
socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes" affected decision).
246. Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2067.
247. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2068. Finkelman's thesis is that during the colonial
and antebellum periods, race could create a presumption of a certain status (that is, being a
slave) which, in essence, made one a criminal; race could create a crime out of normally
noncriminal activity;, and race could affect punishment, usually to the detriment of blacks. i.
at 2067-70. This Note concentrates only on the latter two "crimes of color."
248. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2064.
249. Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2064. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the Lovings, an interracial couple, and overturned
the law prohibiting interracial marriages. Id. at 12.
250. Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2070-71 (noting howJohn Rolfe, secretary and recorder
for Virginia Company of London, documented arrival of first blacks, "20. and odd Negroes," in
1619). To provide a narrower focus to this section, this Note cites primarily to statutes and cases
from Virginia. For a discussion of why Virginia is an appropriate state on which to concentrate,
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of these first blacks is debated, 5' whites began treating blacks
differently by the middle of the century.2 52  The case of In re Negro
John Punch (1640) demonstrates how whites early in American history
gave enhanced penalties for blacks committing the same acts as
whites. 3  In this case, three servants, two white and one black,
received sentences for attempting to run away together.2M All three
were whipped.255 The court also imposed additional time of service
onto each person's indenture. 56 The two white servants received
an additional four years while John Punch, a black man, was
sentenced to lifetime slavery.257 Race, in this case, affected punish-
ment. The court gave the black defendant a sentence of lifetime
slavery, but it gave the white defendants only four years for commit-
ting the same crime." s
see A. Leon Higginbotham,Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather Than theFree": FreeBlacks in Colonial
and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 17, 20 (1991) [hereinafter Higginbotham &
Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free']. Higginbotham & Bosworth write:
Virginians played a major role in leading the American Revolution and in shaping the
destiny of the new nation after 1776. Yet, tragically, Virginia was also a leader in the
debasement of blacks by pioneering a legal process that perpetuated racial injustice.
Just as they emulated other aspects of Virginia's policies, many colonies followed
Virginia's leadership in slavery law.
Id.
This Note suggests that the ideas expressed and conclusions reached in this section are not
limited to Virginia, but are ones of general applicability to the South and some Northern states
as well. See generally Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2093 (noting that most British mainland
colonies followed Virginia's lead in associating race with criminal behavior).
251. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 39 (1989) (stating
that before 1660, status of blacks "apparently equaled that of white indentured servants");
Fimkelman, supra note 242, at 2071 (explaining that status of first blacks is unknown, but
historians generally agree that they were treated as indentured servants).
252. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2071 (noting that Virginians gradually made
distinctions between Europeans and Africans). Virginia first recognized slave status in 1662
when it declared:
WHEREAS some doubts have arrisen whether children got by any Englishman upon
a negro woman should be slave or ffree, Be it therefore enacted and declared by this present
grand assembly, that all children borne in this country shalbe held bond or free only
according to the condition of the mother.
Negro Womens Children to Serve According to the Condition of the Mother, in 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE;
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 170, 170 (enacted 1662) (William Wailer
Hening ed. 1823) [hereinafter HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE]. Virginia did not enact its first
statute on the legality of enslavement, however, until 1670. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. &
Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia,
77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1973 (1989) [hereinafter Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex].
253. See A- LEON HIGGINBOTHAM,JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS 28-29 (1978) [hereinafter HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATrER OF COLOR] (discussing
In re Negro John Punch).
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In colonial and antebellum Virginia, slaves could receive the death
penalty for sixty-eight offenses, while whites could be put to death for
only one, first-degree murder.259 Slaves throughout the South could
receive the death penalty for murder, attempted murder, manslaugh-
ter, rape and attempted rape of a white woman, rebellion and
attempted rebellion, poisoning, robbery, arson, and, in some
instances, assault and battery on a white person.21 In Virginia,
slaves could be executed for any crime that, if committed by a white
person, called for a prison sentence of not less than three years.6
Disparities in punishment did not necessarily depend on slave
status, however. Free blacks also received enhanced penalties for
committing the same crimes as whites.262 In 1705, for example, the
Virginia legislature enacted a law requiring disparate treatment for
stealing hogs. The act declared:
[I]f any person or persons shall, from and after the publication of
this act, steal any hog, shoat, or pig, every person so offending,
shall, for the first offence, receive on his or her bare back, twenty-
five lashes, or pay down ten pounds current money of Virginia; and
if a negro, mulatto, or Indian, thirty-nine lashes well laid
on .... 263
Thus, under this law, whites received twenty-five lashes on a bare back
or a ten pound fine. Blacks, both slave and free, however, received
thirty-nine lashes with no chance of paying the fine to avoid the whip-
ping.
264
259. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy": The
Legitimization of Racial Powerlsness Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virgnia,
70 N.C. L. REv. 969, 1022 (1992) [hereinafter Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law Only As an
Enemy"]. Men of all races committing the crime of rape faced the death sentence in colonial
Virginia. Id. at 1057. By 1848, however, whites could not be sentenced to death for rape, but
blacks could. Id. at 1059.
260. Kenneth M. Stampp, Chattels Personal in AMERiCAN ILAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER HISTORICAL PERsPEGcIvEs 203, 209 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds.,
1988).
261. Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1022.
262. Higginbotham & Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1023. In
addition to enhanced penalties, free blacks could be enslaved as a form of punishment whereas
whites could not. Id. In 1823, the Virginia legislature declared:
Henceforth, when any free Negro shall be convicted of an offense, now by law
punished by imprisonment for more than two years, such person instead of
confinement shall be punished by stripes at the discretion of the jury, and shall
moreover be adjudged to be sold as a slave and banished beyond the limits of the
United States.
Id. (citing Act of Feb. 21, 1823, ch. 32 § 3, 1822-23 Va. Acts 35, 35-36).
263. An Act Against Stealing Hogs, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 252, at 276,
276 (enacted 1705).
264. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2089 (discussing 1705 law against stealing hogs).
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In 1705, the Virginia legislature also imposed a special penalty of
thirty lashes on a bare back for any "negro, mulatto, or Indian, bond
or free" who "lift[ed] his or her hand, in opposition against any
christian, not being negro, mulatto, or Indian."2" A white person
raising his or her hand against a free black person or another white,
however, was punished under the normal laws of battery.26 Assault
of a slave was not even a criminal offense in the eighteenth centu-
ry.67  In fact, the Virginia'legislature enacted laws in 166921 and
170569 relieving any slaveholder who killed his slave of all criminal
liability."' It was not until 1723 that the Virginia legislature began
to punish whites for killing slaves, but only extreme forms of slave
torture resulting in death warranted a penalty.27 1 If a slave killed a
white person, however, intent to murder was presumed and, if found
guilty, the slave was put to death.272
265. An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 252,
at 447, 459 (enacted 1705).
266. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2091.
267. Higginbotham & Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1044-45.
268. An Act About the Casual Killing of Slaves, in 2 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
252, at 270, 270 (enacted 1669). The act declared:
[1]f any slave resist his master (or other by his master's order correcting him) and by
the extremity of the correction should chance to die, that his death shall not be
accompted ffelony, but the master (or that other person appointed by the master to
punish him) be acquit from molestation, since it cannot be presumed that prepensed
malice (which alone makes murther ffelony) should induce any man to destroy his
owne estate.
Id. (emphasis added).
269. An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 252,
at 447, 459 (enacted 1705). The act read.
And if any slave resist his master, or owner, or other person, by his or her order,
correcting such slave, and shall happen to be killed in such correction, it shall not be
accounted felany, but the master, owner, and every such other person so giving
correction, shall be free and acquit of all punishment and accusation for the same, as
if such accident had never happened.
Id. (emphasis added).
270. See also Stampp, supra note 260, at 212 (noting that killing slave also was not felony in
Georgia prior to 1770, and in North Carolina prior to 1775).
271. See Higginbotham & Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1030
(discussing 1723 law under which white person in Virginia could be prosecuted for willful,
malicious, or designed killing of slave). After the American Revolution, most Southern states
began to define malicious killing of a slave as a felony. Stampp, supra note 260, at 212. These
laws, however, were subject to significant qualifications. A person did not commit homicide, for
instance, where he caused the death of a slave while administering "moderate correction." Id.
A person also was entitled to the defense of "justifiable homicide" when he killed a slave who
was in the act of rebelling or resisting legal arrest. ld. Moreover, Stampp claims that even
whites who, by a reasonable interpretation of the law, were guilty of feloniously killing slaves
usually escaped conviction because blacks could not testify against whites, white witnesses rarely
testified against white offenders, and white juries rarely convicted white defendants in such
matters. Id. at 213-14. In this instance, "race did not create criminality, but it did allow for
criminality to go unpunished." Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2089.
272. Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1027.
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Moreover, Virginians did not recognize the right of self-defense for
any blacks until 1792.27 Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin of the North
Carolina Supreme Court lent his insight into why the defense of self-
defense was a risky proposition, at least for slaves. He posited that if
slaves could decide when they were entitled to resist white men, they
xMay be encouraged "to [denounce] the injustice of slavery itself, and,
upon that pretext, band together to throw off their common bondage
entirely." 4 At the same time, the slightest provocation by a black
person toward a white person was criminal. By law in 1848, the
Virginia legislature declared: "[s]laves or free Negroes using
provoking or menacing language or gestures to a white person... are
punishable by stripes, not exceeding thirty-nine."275 The racial
significance of these laws cannot be ignored.
For much of the colonial era, both black and white men faced the
death penalty for the rape of a white woman in Virginia.276 As the
years progressed, however, the legislature continually imposed lesser
punishments on whites for rape and attempted rape and greater
penalties on blacks. In 1769, the Virginia legislature determined that
castration was too severe a penalty for whites convicted of attempted
rape of a white woman, but permitted such a penalty for blacks. 7 7
By 1823, the legislature decided that slaves or free blacks found guilty
of attempted rape of a white woman were to "suffer death by hanging
by the neck."271 In 1848, although slaves continued to receive the
death penalty, free blacks convicted of raping a white woman or of
abducting a female with intent to defile were subject to the death
penalty, or, "at the discretion of the jury confinement of five to twenty
years."2 79 Whites, by this time, could not be executed for rape and
273. Higginbotham & Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1029.
Higginbotham &Jacobs refer to the limited right of self-defense as a "right without a remedy"
because blacks were still unable to testify against whites. Id
274. MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAvERY 1810-1860. CONSIDERATIONS OF
HuMANIy AND INTEREST 120 (1981) (quoting State v. Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391 (1849)
(Ruffin, CJ., dissenting)); see also Stampp, supra note 260, at 213 (citing Tennessee Supreme
Court which stated that if master exercised his right to punish, "with or without cause, [and] the
slave resist and slay him, it is murder.., because the law cannot recognize the violence of the
master as a legitimate cause of provocation").
275. Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy, "supra note 259, at 1029 (citingAct
of 1848, ch. XII, § 6, 1847-48 Va. Acts 125, 125).
276. Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1056.
277. See Higginbotham & Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1058
(discussing penalties for attempted rape of white woman under 1769 statute).
278. Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy, "supra note 259, at 1058 (citingAct
of 1823, ch. 34, § 1, 1822-23 Va. Acts 36, 36).
279. Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law OnlyAs anEneny, "supra note 259, at 1059 (citingAct
of 1848, ch. XIII, 1847-48 Va. Acts 126, 126).
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were subject to ten to twenty years for rape of a white woman and
three to ten years for intent to defile.280
While the disparate treatment of black men and white men found
guilty of rape or attempted rape of white women was frightening,28'
the plight of black women may have been worse s. 22  Rape of a black
woman was punishable by death in the colonial period,283 but there
is not one reported case in which a white person was prosecuted for
the sexual assault of a black woman, slave or free, in either colonial
or antebellum Virginia .2  The disparities in the treatment of blacks
and whites demonstrate one way in which whites criminalized race.
Another method by which whites associated crime with race was to
create a crime out of normally noncriminal activity merely because a
black person was involved."E Every slave state had a slave code, and
these codes were much alike.2 8  These codes restricted slaves'
movements, their communication with others, and their right to
assemble. 7 Slaves could not possess firearms or alcohol, beat
drums, or blow horns.2 ' They could not hire themselves out
without permission or otherwise conduct themselves like free
people.2 9 They could not buy or sell goods, or enter into con-
tracts. 9  These criminal laws exemplify ways in which whites
280. See Higginbotham & Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1059
(discussing penalty provisions under 1848 law).
281. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2100-01 (citing The Law About Tying and Punishing
Negroes, in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE TIME OF WILLIAM PENN 225 (Gail
McKnight Beckman ed., 1887)). In 1697, Pennsylvania sentenced black men to death for raping
white women and castrated them for attempted rape. Id. Whites convicted of the same offense,
however, were fined, whipped or imprisoned for one year. Id. at 2101. In 1700 and again in
1706, Pennsylvania provided a death sentence for any black convicted of rape ofa white woman,
murder, buggery, or burglary. Id. (citing An Act for the Trial of Negroes, 1700 and Act for the Trial
of Negroes, 1706, in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1672-1801 77, 233 (James T.
Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1896)). Rape, buggery, and burglary, however, did not carry
the death sentence for whites. Id
282. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 419
(1974) (stating that no modem historian denies that white slaveholders impregnated their
female slaves, taking some as mistresses, forcing those who resisted).
283. See Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1055-56
(noting that Virginia rape statute prescribing death upon conviction spoke of "woman" in
neutral terms, suggesting that rape of free black woman was punishable offense).
284. Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1056.
285. Fmkelman, supra note 242, at 2068.
286. Stampp, supra note 260, at 207; see alsoJOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR,
FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 114 (6th ed. 1988) (discussing uniformity of slave codes from state
to state).
287. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 286, at 114-15.
288. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 286, at 114-15.
289. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 286, at 114.
290. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 286, at 114.
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stripped slaves of their basic rights in order to maintain their
domination and control.
2 91
Whites also criminalized the normally noncriminal activity of free
blacks. Like slaves, free blacks were denied the right to possess
weapons, and limits were placed on their freedom of association.292
Virginia prohibited free blacks from entering a number of occupa-
tions, including preaching, teaching, and small business owner-
ship.293 In 1705, Virginia made it a crime for any white convicted
of a crime or any black, slave or free, to "bear any office, ecclesiasti-
call, civill or military, or be in any place of public trust or power."
294
Here, by equating blacks to convicted criminals, the legislature
effectively advanced "the notion that race and crime were synony-
mous."2  Virginia also had restricted free blacks' educational
opportunities by 1831 when the legislature officially banned gather-
ings of free blacks for the purpose of learning to read and write.
29
The true "crime of color," however, according to Professor Paul
Finkelman, involved interracial sex and marriage.297 Virginia was
one of the first colonies to enact antimiscegenation statutes.
298
Antimiscegenation statutes subjected interracial couples to special
criminal treatment when they were not married and made the
common act of marriage criminal if the couple chose to legitimize
their relationship.29 In 1662, the Virginia legislature passed its first
statute dealing with interracial sex."°0 The act declared "that if any
christian shall committ fornication with a negro man or woman, hee
or shee soe offending shall pay double the ffines imposed by the
291. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) ("[A]t the time of the
Declaration of Independence and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and
adopted ... [blacks were) so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect.").
292. Higginbotham & Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free; " supra note 250, at 27-33.
293. Higginbotham & Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free" supra note 250, at 42-46.
294. An Act Declaring Who Shall Not Bear Office in This Country, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 252, at 250, 250-51 (enacted 1705).
295. Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2088.
296. See Higginbotham & Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free, "supra note 250, at 57 (discussing
attempts by Virginia legislature to curtail education of blacks). Despite laws to prevent blacks
from receiving an education, many learned how to read and write. See FRANKLIN & Moss, supra
note 286, at 125 (claiming that laws against educating blacks were often circumvented).
Frederick Douglass is one of the better known examples of a slave being taught to read by his
owner. Id.
297. Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2081-87.
298. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex sup-a note 252, at 1967.
299. See infra notes 300-07 and accompanying text (discussing two early Virginia statutes
prohibiting miscegenous sex and marriage).
300. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex, supra note 252, at 1967 n.5.
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former act.""°' The former act referred to in the 1662 statute set
the fine for fornication at 500 pounds of tobacco.0 2  Thus, under
this law, whites faced a special penalty of 1000 pounds of tobacco for
fornicating with a black person.
In 1691, the Virginia legislature enacted its first act against
interracial marriage.3 3 The statute stated:
[F] or the prevention of that abominable mixture and spurious issue
... by negroes, mulattoes, and Indians intermarrying with English,
or other white women.., it is hereby enacted... whatsoever English
or other white man or woman being free shall intermarry with a
negroe, mulatto, or Indian man or woman bond or free shall
within three months after such marriage be banished and removed
from this dominion forevers °4
The enactment of the 1691 law suggests that the former 1662 statute
was not enough to discourage whites (particularly white women) from
entering into sexual relations with blacks."0 ' The legislature realized
that the punishment for interracial fornication failed to deter white
women from producing mixed-race (or "mulatto") children, "that
abominable mixture and spurious issue."306  The legislature, there-
fore, imposed the harsh penalty of banishment on any white person
if he or she chose to marry. his or her black partner.0 7
In addition to imposing punishment for interracial marriage, the
1691 act singled out white women for punishment if they gave birth
to a mulatto child outside of marriage. The statute read:
301. Negro Womens Children to Serve According to the Condition of the Mother, in 2 HENING'S
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 252, at 170, 170 (enacted 1662). This same act created the rule
of inheritance of slave status, see supra note 252 (citing portion of 1662 law setting forth rule
of inheritance of status).
302. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex, supra note 252, at 1993.
303. Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical
Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1966).
304. An Act for Suppressing Outlying Slaves, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 252,
at 86, 86-87 (enacted 1691).
305. See GENOVESE, supra note 282, at 415 (claiming that too often we assume that rpe of
slave women by their masters led to most mixed-race children in this country). Genovese
suggests that miscegenation "primarily occurred outside the plantation heartland" in the towns
and cities. Id. Genovese argues that white men slept with black women and, though less often,
black men slept with white women. Id at 418. "[A]nd much more often than they were
supposed to, those who began by seeking casual pleasure ended by caring." Id. at 418-19. No
doubt some of these couples felt unduly punished by the 1662 law and sought to legitimize their
relationship through marriage.
306. See supra text accompanying note 304 (quoting 1691 statute).
307. See HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 253, at 46 (noting that in
1705, Virginia changed punishment for white partner to six months in prison). The 1705 law
also imposed a fine of 10,000 pounds of tobacco on the minister performing the marriage. Id.
It was not until 1932 that the Virginia legislature imposed a prison term on both blacks and
whites. Id.
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And be it further enacted... That if any English woman being free
shall have a bastard child by any negro or mulatto, she shall pay the
sume of fifteen pounds sterling... to the Church wardens ... and
in default of such payment she shall be taken into possession of the
said Church wardens and disposed of for five yeares... and that
such bastard child be bound out as a servant by the said Church
wardens untill he or she shall attaine the age of thirty yeares °8
This particular clause of the 1691 statute only subjected white women
and their children to punishment. Interestingly, the legislature chose
not to punish white men for producing bastard children with black
women. 
3 09
As Finkelman notes, "[i]n both the 1662 and 1691 laws race became
the key to the legal infraction." 10 Having sexual intercourse and
giving birth to a child outside of marriage was already a violation of
the law, but the Virginia legislature singled out interracial couples for
special treatment311  Moreover, the 1691 law criminalized the
common act of marriage when one of the parties was white and the
other was black. 2 The legislature, furthermore, made the child,
innocent of any wrongdoing, "guilty of the crime of being mulatto"
and sentenced him or her to servitude for thirty years.31 3  Like
Virginia, many states prohibited interracial marriages and provided
severe punishments for interracial fornication. 4
308. An Actfor Suppressing Outlying Slaves, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 252,
at 86, 87 (enacted 1691).
309. See Eva Saks, RepresentingMiscegenation Lax, 8 RARITAN 39, 43 (1988) (commenting that
statutes prohibiting interracial sex and marriage "did not (arguably, nor were they meant to)
deter white men from engaging in sex with black women, especially with their slaves"). The rule
of inheritance of slave status, in fact, provided slave owners with a positive incentive to use their
slave women as breeders. See supra note 252 (quoting 1662 act setting forth rule of inheritance
of status); Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex, supra note 252, at 2006
(discussing effects of rule of inheritance of slave status). David Bryon Davis points out that while
white planter society officially condemned miscegenation, abundant evidence suggests that many
slaveowners, sons of slaveowners, and overseers raped black slave women or took black
mistresses, presumably without punishment. 1 BENARD BAILYN ET AL, THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 465 (1992); see also GENOVESE, supra note 282, at 419
(claiming that "many slaveholders and their growing sons took slave mistresses or forced
reluctant women and fathered mulatto children"). As W.E.B. Du Bois has so aptly stated, "'The
colored slave woman became the medium through which two great races were united."'
GENOVESE, supra note 282, at 413 (quoting W.E.B. DU Bois, GIFT OF BLACK FoLK 144, 146).
310, Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2085.
311. SeeFinkelman, supra note 242, at 2085-87 (describing effects of 1662 and 1691 statutes).
312. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2085 (discussing 1691 antimiscegenation statute).
313. Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2086.
314. Se, eg., Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2095, 2104 (discussing antimiscegenation laws in
Maryland and Massachusetts). In 1717, for example, Maryland law criminalized interracial
marriages and sentenced free blacks and mulattoes to be slaves for life and their white spouses
to be indentured servants for seven years. Id. at 2095. In 1705, Massachusetts prohibited
interracial marriages and subjected persons convicted of interracial fornication to whipping. Id
at 2104. Blacks involved in these relationships were sold out of Massachusetts and jailed
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During the colonial and antebellum periods, race played a key role
in the definition of criminal behavior, and it was an important factor
in punishing crime. Similarly, during Reconstruction and into the
twentieth century, whites associated crime with race. 5 One of the
primary ways in which whites did so was through the "black codes"
and the system of involuntary servitude.
b. Black codes and involuntary servitude
During the period of Presidential Reconstruction, the reorganized
legislatures in the South criminalized previously noncriminal activity
and punished blacks more severely than whites for the same act.316
The "black codes," enacted during the winter of 1865-1866, resembled
the colonial and antebellum slave codes in their attempt to regulate
the conduct of newly freed blacks.317 They achieved this goal by,
among other things, imposing a system of involuntary servitude. 18
William Cohen describes this system in detail, tracing its roots in the
black codes and following it through the mid-1900s 19 Cohen
argues that the system of involuntary servitude fluctuated between free
and forced labor, depending on the needs of the southern labor
market and on the supply of the laborers.32 In this way, Cohen
accounts for the apparent paradox of widespread involuntary
pending the sale. Id.
315. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2064 (noting how race affected criminal law "[w]ell
into the twentieth century").
316. See 2 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL, THE AMERICAN CONsTITUION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 328 (7th ed. 1991) (noting that penal sections in black codes included enhanced
penalty provisions for blacks).
317. BAILYN ET AL., supra note 309, at 674. The black codes differed throughout the states,
but they typically prohibited freed blacks from voting, attending integrated schools, holding all
but the most menialjobs unless they obtained a rarely granted license, quitting theirjobs before
expiration, (and forfeiting their wages if they quit), and keeping arms. See generally id. (stating
that black codes "specified that blacks might not purchase or carry firearms, that they might not
assemble after sunset, and that those who were idle or unemployed should 'be liable to
imprisonment, and to hard labor, one or both'"); ERIC FONER, RECoNSTRUCrION: AMERICA'S
UNFINSHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 199 (1988) (describing how Mississippi required that
"[lI]aborers leaving their jobs before the contract expired would forfeit wages already earned,
and, as under slavery, be subject to arrest by any white citizen"); KELLY ET AL., supra note 316,
at 328 (noting that black codes "contained harsh vagrancy and apprenticeship provisions whose
apparent purpose was to bind the ex-slaves to the soil and strip them of all the practical
attributes of freedom," and "called for racial segregation in schools and other public facilities").
318. William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis,
in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 317 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N.
Scheiber eds., 1988).
319. See id. (noting that system of involuntary servitude was "contained in embryo in the
Black Codes and [gained] increasing strength in the years immediately after Reconstruction").
In his article, Cohen surveys the laws of involuntary servitude as they existed at the end of the
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. To illustrate some of his points, this
section supplements the discussion with the Black Code of Mississippi.
320. Id. at 318.
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servitude and large-scale black migration. He argues that employers
had the legal tools to force labor from blacks, but such measures were
not always required. 21 When labor was scarce, whites enforced the
system of involuntary servitude. When labor was abundant, "Draconi-
an" measures were unnecessary. 22
Cohen explains that "[t] he laws of involuntary servitude facilitated
both the recruitment and the retention of black labor."'323 Some of
these laws focused on white behavior, including enticement laws and
emigrant-agent laws.324 Enticement statutes cemented employers'
proprietary claims to "their" black laborers by making it criminal to
hire blacks who were under contract to other employers."s The
Black Code of Mississippi contained such a statute. It provided:
If any person shall persuade or attempt to persuade, entice or cause
any freedman, free negro or mulatto, to desert from the legal
employment of any person, before the expiration of his or her term
of service .... he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction, shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars and
not more than two hundred dollars and the costs, and if said fine
and costs shall not be immediately paid, the court shall sentence
said convict to not exceeding two months imprisonment in the
county jail, and he or she shall moreover be liable to the party
injured in damages.326
Furthermore, emigrant-agent statutes imposed prohibitive license fees
on whites who moved labor from one state to another.
27
Other statutes focused directly on regulating the behavior of
blacks. 28 Contract-enforcement statutes made it a criminal offense
for a black person, but not a white person, to break a labor con-
tract.3 29 The Black Code of Mississippi declared:
All contracts for labor made with freedmen, free negroes and
mulattoes, for a longer period than one month shall be in writing
*.. and if the laborer shall quit the service of the employer, before
expiration of his term of service, without good cause, he shall




324. See id. at 319-20 (discussing enticement laws and emigrant-agent laws).
325. Id. at 318.
326. An Act to Confer Civil Rights on Freed Men, and for Other Purpose% ch. 4, § 9, 1865 Miss.
Laws 85 (current version at Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-29 (1994)) [hereinafter An Act to Confer
Civil Rights].
327. Cohen, supra note 318, at 318.
328. See Cohen, supra note 318, at 318 (describing statutes focusing on regulation of blacks,
including contract-enforcement laws and vagrancy laws).
329. See Cohen, supra note 318, at 318.
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officer shall, and every person may arrest and carry back to his or
her legal employer any freedman, free negro or mulatto, who shall
have quit the service of his or her employer before the expiration
of his or her employer before the expiration of his or her term of
service without good cause."' 0
Broad vagrancy statutes, likewise, permitted police to round up blacks
in times of labor shortage by criminalizing the act of being black and
unemployed."' 1 The Black Code of Mississippi provided:
[A]ll freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes in this State, over the
age of eighteen years, found on the second Monday in January,
1866, or thereafter, with no lawful employment or business, or
found unlawfully assembling themselves together ... shall be
deemed vagrants, and on conviction thereof, shall be fined in the
sum of not exceeding... fifty dollars... and imprisoned at the
discretion of the court.., not exceeding ten days.
332
The same act provided criminal punishment for whites associating or
"usually associating" with blacks.33
Criminal-surety statutes and convict-labor statutes further enforced
the system of involuntary servitude by forcing those blacks jailed on
charges of vagrancy (or any other petty crime) to work either for any
white willing to post bond or for the chain gangs.sM Cohen suggests
that it was not uncommon for prisoners to choose a surety agreement
in lieu of ajail sentence, despite the fact that the surety contract was
longer than the jail sentence.3 5 The chain gangs, he points out,
brought back the many evils of slavery, as convict lessees used
shackles, dogs, whips, and guns to create a "living hell" for prison-
ers.3  The mortality rates on the chain gang were astonishing. For
instance, 44.9% of the convicts sent to build a railroad in South
Carolina between the years 1877-1880 died.37 These involuntary
servitude statutes illustrate how state legislatures created a crime out
330. An Act to Confer Civil Rights, supra note 326, §§ 6, 7.
331. Cohen, supra note 318, at 324.
332. An Act to Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, ch. 6, § 2, 1865 Miss. Laws, microformed on
Session Laws of American States and Colonies, Fiche 134 (Redgrave Info. Resources Group).
333. See id. (stating that whites "assembling" with blacks, or "usually associating" with them
.on terms of equality, or living in adultery or fornication" with black woman shall be subject to
fine not exceeding $200 and imprisonment not exceeding six months).
334. See Cohen, supra note 318, at 318 (describing how criminal-surety statutes gave blacks
jailed on charges of vagrancy "opportunity" to sign voluntary labor contract with their former
employer or any other white person willing to post bond). If a black person chose not to sign
a labor contract, under the convict-labor statutes he or she often wound up on a chain gang,
which is essentially a state-sponsored form of involuntary servitude. Id.
335. Cohen, supra note 318, at 327.
336. Cohen, supra note 318, at 328.
337. Cohen, supra note 318, at 328.
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of a normally noncriminal activity and subjected blacks to more severe
punishments than whites."a
While Congress voided most black code legislation during the
decade following the Civil War,"39 former confederate states re-
established the labor controls first enacted in 1865-1866 after the
Redeemers took power in the mid-1870s.' Although these new
laws made no mention of'race, Southerners knew °that the laws were
meant to strengthen white's control over the labor system, and
Southern authorities implemented them accordingly.341  This system
of involuntary servitude remained in effect well into the twentieth
centurym2
c. Conclusions
Thus, our country has a history of associating crime with blacks. 3
American society has recognized and continues to accept the idea that
a person's race can increase penalties for a crime or can create a
crime out of normally noncriminal activity.' Fear of black men
raping white women extended beyond the colonial and antebellum
338. SeeKELLY ET AL., supra note 316, at 328 (noting that"the penal sections [of black codes]
provided for more severe and arbitrary punishment for [blacks) than for whites").
339. See Cohen, supra note 318, at 319 ("Reconstruction voided most Black Code
legislation."); see also KELLY Er AL, supra note 316, at 329-30 (discussing Civil Rights Act of 1866,
passed in response to black codes). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 embody the present language
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory,
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property.
Id. (1988).
340. See Cohen, supra note 318, at 319 (describing post-Reconstruction efforts in former
confederate states to legislate blacks back onto farms); see also BALYN Er AL, supra note 309, at
716 (describing process by which Redeemers used economic pressure to keep blacks from
becoming politically active).
341. Cohen, supra note 318, at 318; see also FoNER, supra note 317, at 201 (commenting that
it was well understood that vagrancy laws applied to blacks).
342. See Cohen, supra note 318, at 319 (surveying involuntary servitude laws and ways in
which courts applied them to create system of involuntary servitude).
343. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2063-64 (noting that to understand "modem
relationship between race and criminal law one must study the historical connection between
defining crime, criminal law, and race").
344. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2064 (finding roots of contemporary, pervasive
association between color and crime in colonial and early national past).
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periods.' Every man put to death for rape in Virginia between
1908 and 1962 was black.' Antimiscegenation laws, moreover,
survived the Constitution of 1787, the Civil War Amendments of the
1860s and 1870s, and the Brown decision of 1954.1 7 As late as 1967,
when the Supreme Court finally struck down laws prohibiting
interracial marriages as unconstitutional,' sixteen states still
criminalized marriages based on the race of the participants.
Color itself, in those states, was a sign of criminality.35 ° Accordingly,
having satisfied the first prong of Lawrence's cultural meaning test,
the analysis now addresses the significance of race and drugs.
2. History of attaching racial significance to certain drugs
Fear of a particular drug's effects on a specific minority garnishes
the most emphatic support for the legal prohibition of narcotics."'
When the majority popularizes a certain drug, such as alcohol,
tobacco, or coffee, the majority often places few restrictions on that
drug's purchase or use.352 As the use of the drug declines or
becomes associated with a disempowered segment of society,
restrictive legislation expands. 3
345. See Higginbotham & Jacobs, The "Law Only as an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1059
(discussing emergence of lynching as one method to dominate black sexuality at turn of
twentieth century).
346. Higginbotham &Jacobs, The "Law Only as an Enemy," supra note 259, at 1060. In 1977,
the Supreme Court, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), held it unconstitutional to
sentence a man to death for the rape of an adult woman. Id. at 592.
347. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2087 (tracking survival of Virginia antimiscegenation
laws).
348. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (overturning law prohibiting interracial
marriage).
349. See id at 6 n.5 (noting that in addition to Virginia, 15 states outlawed interracial
marriage: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia).
350. See Finkelman, supra note 242, at 2064 ("Well into the twentieth century American law
recognized and accepted the notion that race could ... create a crime out of a normally
noncriminal activity.").
351. SeeMUSTO, supra note 75, at 244-45 (noting how white majority associated certain drugs
with identifiable and threatening minority groups). For example, the white majority felt that
cocaine enabled blacks to withstand bullets and stimulated them to commit sexual assault,
opium facilitated sexual contact between Chinese and whites, marijuana incited Hispanics to
violence, and heroin contributed to "crime wave" following World War I and was part of a
Communist conspiracy against United States in 1950s. Id.
352. See Lowney, supra note 84, at 136 (arguing that drug will not be prohibited when "denial
of a drug's destructive effect is politically comfortable"). Lowney points out that there are 100
Americans using alcohol for every one person regularly using cocaine, and, Lowney maintains,
alcohol and tobacco are arguably more dangerous than cocaine, cannabis, or opiates. Id. at 136-
37; see also Musro, supra note 75, at 1-3, 6-7 (discussing one-time popularity and accessibility of
opium, its derivatives, and cocaine--drugs later made illegal).
353. See MUSTO, supra note 75, at 245 (noting that legal prohibition of cocaine, opium,
marijuana, and heroin all came at time of social crisis between drug-linked group and rest of
American society); Tonry, supra note 74, at 39 ("[1]n periods of high intolerance of drug use,
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Cocaine (and its derivative, crack, it will later be argued) is no
exception. Cocaine was first isolated in its pure form from the coca
leaf in 1 86 0 ." Cocaine use did not become widespread, however,
until the 1880s when doctors began to recognize its beneficial effects,
particularly its ability to suppress fatigue.355 In the United States,
cocaine became popular during the end of the nineteenth century as
a general tonic and as a cure for opium, morphine, and alcohol
addictions. 5 ' Cocaine also became popular for non-medical
purposes. 57 Companies catered to their customers by placing
cocaine in Coca-Cola, wines, and cigarettes."5 In addition, bars
often put a pinch of cocaine in a shot of whiskey. 59 Employers also
distributed cocaine to construction and mine workers to increase their
productivity.36
By the turn of the century, however, many prominent newspapers,
physicians, pharmacists, and legislators began to warn of the dangers
of cocaine."1 The American Medical Association, for example,
argued that cocaine had no value except as medicine.362 David
Musto suggests that other influential whites feared the effects of
cocaine use among blacks. 3  Whites began to dread cocaine
because they felt it threatened to spread into the "higher social ranks
of the country"36 and it undermined essential social restrictions
which kept blacks under control.3" Whites imagined that blacks on
cocaine had superhuman strength, were almost unaffected by bullets,
minority group stereotypes have been associated with deviant drug use.").
354. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at 462.
355. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at 462 (noting that in 1883, Dr. Theodor Aschenbrandt
issued cocaine to Bavarian soldiers to suppress fatigue); see also Musro, supra note 75, at 7
(explaining that Sigmund Freud was famous advocate of cocaine for medical purposes).
356. See MUSTO, supra note 75, at 7 (detailing medicinal uses of cocaine). In fact, former
army surgeon general William Hammond was "proud to announce" that cocaine was the official
remedy of the Hay Fever Association. Id.
357. See MusTO, supra note 75, at 7-8.
358. See MUsro, supra note 75, at 7 (relating many ways in which manufacturers took
advantage of cocaine's "exhilarating properties").
359. See MUSTO, supra note 75, at 8 (describing how cocaine could replace or enhance
alcohol, especially in dry states).
360. MUSTO, supra note 75, at 8. According to Musto, cocaine was reportedly given to
construction and mine workers to make them productive on little food. Id.
361. SeeMusro, supra note 75, at 65 (discussing increasing unpopularity of cocaine because
influential Americans believed cocaine predisposed drug users toward insanity and crime).
362. MuSTO, supra note 75, at 64.
363. See MuSTO, supra note 75, at 7 (stating that southern whites feared "cocainized" blacks
because cocaine would spur violence against whites).
364. SeeMusro, supra note 75, at 42-43 (discussing Dr. Hamilton Wright's report, which was
submitted in support of drug-trafficking bill, and identified threat of cocaine use moving into
higher social ranks).
365. See MUSTO, supra note 75, at 6 ("The South feared that Negro cocaine users might
become oblivious of their prescribed bounds and attack white society").
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and had improved pistol marksmanship." Perhaps most frighten-,
ing to the leaders of the drive against cocaine was their belief that, as
Dr. Christopher Koch stated in 1914, "'[m]ost of the attacks upon
white women of the South are the direct result of a cocaine-crazed
Negro brain."' 67 As Musto argues, these beliefs characterized white
fear, not the reality of cocaine's effects, and gave whites yet another
reason to repress blacks." s
The widespread association of cocaine with race, whether legitimate
or not,s8 9 eased the way for legislative movements attempting to
prohibit the drug.7 ° The Harrison Act of 19147' was the first
federal law to prohibit distribution of cocaine and heroin.
8 72
Representative Francis Burton Harrison, the sponsor of the Act, 73
moved to include coca leaves7 4 into the precursor to the Harrison
Act, the Foster bill." As a motive for doing so, Harrison exclaimed
that the leaves were used in "'Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola and all those
things that are sold to Negroes all over the South."' 78 Dr. Hamil-
ton Wright, referred to as "the father of American narcotic laws,"8 7
similarly submitted a report to Congress in which he stressed
cocaine's identification with blacks. 7 ' Dr. Wright warned of
366. SeeMUSTO, supra note 75, at 7. Musto notes that one myth, that .32 caliber bullets had
almost no affect on blacks on cocaine, apparently caused southern police departments to switch
to .38 caliber revolvers. Id.
367. See MUSTO, supra note 75, at 6 n.15 (crediting Dr. Koch with quotation) (citation
omitted).
368. See MUSTO, supra note 75, at 7.
369. See MuSrO, supra note 75, at 8 (questioning accuracy of newspaper reports of
"cocainomania" among blacks). Despite claims of widespread use, the use of cocaine among
blacks seems to have been much lower than society perceived it to be. SeeUnited States v. Clary,
846 F. Supp. 768, 775 (E.D. Mo.) (stating that "[t]rue or not, the black addict became a
stereotype not synonymous with most black men"), retld, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied
115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995); MuSTO, supra note 75, at 8 (noting that of 2100 black admissions to
Georgia asylum between 1909 and 1914, only two were cocaine users).
370. See MUSTO, supra note 75, at 6 n.15 (arguing that society began associating cocaine
problem with blacks in 1900 and by 1910 it was easy to pass legislation almost totally prohibiting
drug); see also Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 775 ("The images of narcotics and a black rebellion in the
South and images of black addicts involved with white women were central to the hysteria that
motivated legislative enactments.").
371. Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
372. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 775.
373. I&
374. See MUSTO, supra note 75, at 46.
375. See MUSTO, supra note 75, at 41 (stating that Foster bill was direct antecedent of
Harrison Act). For elements of the Foster bill, see id. at 41-42, and for elements of the Harrison
Act, see id at 59-65.
376. MusmO, supra note 75, at 46 (quoting Importation and Use of Opium: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1911)) [hereinafter Opium Hearings]
(statement of Dr. Hamilton Wright).
377. Musmo, supra note 75, at 31.
378. Musmo, supra note 75, at 43 (stating that Wright thought identification of blacks with
cocaine had not been sufficiently publicized).
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cocaine's "'encouragement ... among the humbler ranks of the
Negro population in the South"'379 and concluded that "'it has been
authoritatively stated that cocaine is often the direct incentive to the
crime of rape by the Negroes of the South and other sections of the
country."'" Thus, social and racial biases predominated over
objective factors such as cocaine's pharmacological effects, in the
legislators' consideration of the Harrison Act.
3 '
As the enactment of the Harrison Act illustrates, the United States
has a history of attaching racial significance to certain drugs.382
Under Lawrence's cultural meaning test,' however, courts must
consider more than historical evidence in determining whether racial
animus motivated Congress to enact the crack statute.3  -Courts
must also consider the contemporary meaning given to crack cocaine
by American culture.' Therefore, we must consider the third
prong in the cultural meaning analysis, that is, whether there was a
widespread public association of crack with race at the time Congress
provided the enhanced penalty provisions for crack cocaine.
3. Widespread public association of crack cocaine with race
The use of cocaine did not entirely disappear after passage of the
Harrison Act. 6 However, the drug did move underground where
it remained for nearly half a century38' There, cocaine became
popular with musicians, poets, artists and writers, prostitutes and
criminals, "beatniks," and Hollywood entertainers.' The associa-
tion of powder cocaine with such exotic groups led to its reputation
as "the rich man's drug." 89
379. MUsTo, supra note 75, at 43 (quoting Opium Hearings, supra note 376 (statement of Dr.
Hamilton Wright)).
380. MusTo, supra note 75, at 43-44 (quoting S. Doc. No. 377,61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910)).
381. Cf Lowney, supra note 84, at 135-37 (arguing that arbitrary judgments based on media-
provoked hysteria, rather than reliance on objective criteria, such as drug's pharmacological
effects are paramount in establishing national drug policies).
382. See supra note 351 and accompanying text (noting how white majority associated other
drugs with identifiable and threatening minority group).
383. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 355-58 (discussing cultural meaning test).
384. SeeLawrence, supra note 170, at 356 (noting that cultural meaning test requires inquiry
into historical and social context in which decision was made).
385. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 366 (stating that, in addition to historical meaning of
residential segregation, plaintiffs in Arlington Heights could present evidence of contemporary
meaning).
386. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at 463 (explaining that cocaine use persisted during early
years of twentieth century).
387. SeeInciardi, supra note 78, at 463 (noting that cocaine slipped into underground culture
for approximately 40 years after passage of Harrison Act).
388. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at 463-64 (describing and characterizing major users of
cocaine in underground culture).
389. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 464.
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Powder cocaine moved from the underground to mainstream
society in the 1960s and 1970s, and became "the drug" of the early
1980s."g  In 1982, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)
estimated that between twenty and twenty-four million Americans had
tried cocaine at least once in their lives, between eleven and thirteen
million had used cocaine during the previous year, and between three
and five million had used cocaine during the past month."' 1 NIDA
also reported that cocaine use among all income and class groups was
high. 92 Even as cocaine grew in popularity and use, however, the
public continued to associate cocaine with the rich and glamor-
ous.
3 9 3
Despite the growing use of cocaine, Congress passed no new drug
laws during the early years of the war on drugs to further criminalize
or penalize cocaine possession. 94  Moreover, law enforcement
officials did not aggressively enforce the drug policy.95 The district
court in Clay noted that in the early years of the drug war, few
people paid attention to the escalating violence among inner city
gangs involved in the drug trade. 9 The media, for example, rarely
390. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 775 (E.D. Mo.) (tracing trail of cocaine),
rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995); Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra
note 10, at 25 (testimony of Robert Byck, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry and Pharmacology, Yale
University School of Medicine) (noting that use of cocaine increased in 1970s and reached peak
of epidemic in early 1980s); Inciardi, supra note 78, at 464 (explaining that cocaine use began
to move from underground to mainstream society in 1960s and early 1970s). Inciardi attributes
cocaine's move into the mainstream to a combination of events in Washington, D.C. Id. He
notes first that the federal government sponsored legislation to reduce the legal production of
amphetamine-type drugs in the United States and to place strict controls on Quaaludes and
other abused sedatives. Id. Second, the World Bank allocated funds for the construction of the
Pan American Highway through the jungles of Peru. Id. In combination, Inciardi argues, these
two factors ushered in the modem cocaine era. Id.
391. Avraham Forman & Susan B. Lachter, The National Institute on Drug Abuse Cocaine
Prevention Campaign, in COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS ABOUT DRUGS 13, 13-14 (Pamela J.
Shoemaker ed., 1989).
392. See id, at 14 (presenting results from survey by NIDA which showed, despite public
perception of cocaine as drug only for wealthy, that cocaine use was high among people of all
incomes and classes).
393. Id. at 14; see Morganthau et al., supra note 11, at 58 (claiming that most Americans in
1986 associated cocaine with "jet-setters ... movie moguls, rock stars and professional athletes"),
reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 4418 (1986). Despite its reputation as "the rich man's drug," cocaine
was available at affordable prices in the 1980s. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 42
(testimony of former employee of crack house) (noting that price of one gram of cocaine went
from $200 to $100 from 1981 to 1986, leading him to conclude that cocaine was no longer rich
man's drug); id. at 15 (statement of Charles R. Schuster, Ph.D., Director, NIDA) (testifying that
dealers sold cocaine in lots of at least one gram for about $100).
394. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 775 (revealing that legislators fought war on drugs with respect
to powder cocaine by concentrating on impeding international import of drug and targeting
large scale financiers).
395. See id. at 775-76 ("The social history is clear that so long as cocaine powder was a
popular amusement among young, white professionals, law enforcement policy prohibiting
cocaine was weakly enforced.").
396. Id. at 777.
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did more than mention a victim's name.311 According to the district
court in Clary, the government responded only when suburbanites
and European tourists became the targets of drug-related crimes."9 '
Even then, much of law enforcement concentrated on "controlling
crime" by keeping it boxed up in inner city ghettos.
3 99
By the end of 1985, crack cocaine emerged as "a new form of
cocaine"' and immediately captivated the media's attention.
401
The media first mentioned crack on November 17, 1985.4o2 In less
than eleven months, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los
Angeles Times, the wire services, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World
Report published more than one thousand crack-related stories. °
In response, television networks broadcasted over four hundred
reports of crack-related news.40 4 Many of these stories on crack bore
a frightening resemblance to statements made in support of the
Harrison Act of 1914 in that they: (1) associated crack cocaine with




400. John E. Merriam, National Media Coverage of Drug Issues, 1983-1987, in COMMUNICATION
CAMPAIGNS ABOUT DRUGS 21, 24 (PamelaJ. Shoemaker ed., 1989) (discussing increased media
coverage of crack cocaine during 1985 and 1986 compared to coverage in previous years). But
see Inciardi, supra note 78, at 468 (noting that crack has been around since early 1970s).
401. Clay, 846 F. Supp. at 783; see Stephen D. Reese & Lucig H. Danielian, Intermedia
Influence and the Drug Isue: Converging on Cocaine, in COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS ABOUT DRUGS,
supra note 400, at 29, 30 (referring to media coverage of drug issue during summer of 1986 as
.cocaine summer").
402. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 481. In the article, Program for Cocaine-Abuse under Way,
journalist Donna Boundy credited the head of a school-based drug abuse prevention and
counseling service with stating- "[t]hree teenagers have sought treatment already this year..
. for cocaine dependence resulting from the use of a new form of the drug called 'crack,' or
rock-like pieces of prepared 'freebase' (concentrated) cocaine." Donna Boundy, Programfor
Cocaine-Abuse Under Way, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1985, at § 22, 12.
403. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at 481 (discussing crack cocaine's sudden and increasing
appearance in mass media during late 1985 and throughout 1986); see, e.g., Peter Kerr, Growth
in Heroin Use Ending as City Users Turn to Crack; N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1986, at Al; Lamar, supra
note 11, at 16; Tom Morganthau et al., Crack and Crime, NEWSWEEK,June 16, 1986, at 16, reprinted
in 132 CONG. REC. 13,027 (1986).
404. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 481-82. High profile coverage of crack cocaine reached
millions of television viewers. CBS, for example, capped off its reporting with "48 Hours on
Crack Street" which reached 15 million viewers and became one of the highest rated
documentaries ever. Id. at 82. Shortly thereafter, NBC also aired "Cocaine Country." Id.
405. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 781 (discussing media's role in construction of national image)
The court noted that "the media has played an important role in the construction of a national
image of black male youth as 'the criminal' in two significant respects which served to enhance
penalties for crack cocaine violators: (1) generating public panic regarding crack cocaine; and
(2) associating black males with crack cocaine." Id. (citations omitted); see also Pamela J.
Shoemaker, Introduction, in COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS ABOUT DRUGS, supra note 400, at 1, 2
(explaining that some studies look at agenda-setting as process through which media may
influence degree of importance placed on various issues by public).
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The media branded a stereotype of black crack users and dealers
into the public's mind 6 despite the fact that the vast majority of
blacks are not involved with drugs or the drug trade.40 7 Studies do
indicate that a higher percentage of black cocaine users than white
cocaine users ingest crack.0 It is also true that the majority of the
street-corner sellers of crack are black .4 ' Raw numbers reveal,
however, that whites constitute the majority of crack users410 and
cocaine traffickers. 411  Even former federal drug czar William
Bennett admitted that "[tihe typical cocaine user is white, male, a
high school graduate employed full time and living in a small
metropolitan area or suburb. 412
Despite this evidence, the media chose to associate crack -with
blacks. For instance, Time declared that crack was most popular in
inner cities and that more than half of the crack users were black.418
Another journalist announced: " [m] ost of the dealers, as with. past
406. Seepowell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 611 (explaining how media and opportunistic
politicians used disproportionate focus on black narcotic offenders to place inaccurate portrait
of blacks in public mind). The coverage of crack-related news stories etched into the public
mind a portrait of
"gun-toting black teenage gangs, ghetto crack houses where unspeakable horrors take
place, and depraved black women who prostitute themselves to raise money for their
crack, and who give birth to tiny, drug addicted babies whose pictures are plastered all
over our subway cars in extravagantly graphic public service messages warning of the
dangers of drugs."
Id. (quoting L. Siegel, The Criminalization of Pregnancy: A Paradigm of America's "Harm
Maximization"Approach to Drug Use (memorandum prepared for ACLU and on file with U.C.
Davis Law Review)).
407. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 609 (arguing that despite alarming statistics
of minority youth involvement in drugs and violence "vast majority of minority youth are not
involved with drugs") (emphasis added).
408. See Lowney, supra note 84, at 146-47 (noting correlation between preference for crack
or powder cocaine and ethnicity). NIDA found that in 1990 slightly over 9% of whites and 31%
of blacks who had used cocaine had tried crack. Id. at 147 (citing NATIONAL INSTITUE ON DRUG
ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDINGS 59, tbl. 4.8 (1990)),
409. See Harris, supra note 9, at A26.
410. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 787 n.68 (E.D. Mo.) (noting that National
Household Survey revealed that over 2.4 million whites have used crack, as opposed to 990,000
blacks (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG
ABUSE 38-39 (1992))), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. deniAc 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995). In
other words, of all the people having used crack, 64.4% were white and 26.2% were black. I&.
Moreover, the same study revealed that nearly 8.7 million whites had used an illicit drug within
the past month, compared with 1.6 million blacks, Meddis, supra note 4, at A2, and that blacks
constitute 12% of the nation's drug users, powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 610 (quoting
Harris, supra note 9, at A1); cf Ishmail Reed, Turning Out Network Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,1991,
at A25 (citing USA Today poll which showed that blacks made up 15% of drug users and whites
constituted 70%).
411. See Meddis, supra note 4, at A2 (acknowledging that, according to Drug Enforcement
Administrator Chief Robert Bonner, majority of drug traffickers are white); Harris, supra note
9, at Al (noting that whites sell most of nation's cocaine).
412. Harris, sup-a-note,9 , at Al.
413. Lania, supra note 11, at 16-17.
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drug trends, are black or Hispanic .... Whites rarely sell the cocaine
rocks."" 4 The media also warned of an "infestation" of crack
houses in the ghettos.415 "Street sales of cocaine rocks," one jour-
nalist determined, "have occurred in the same neighborhoods where
.other drugs were sold in the past: run-down, black neighbor-
hoods."416 The media rarely covered stories of young blacks avoid-
ing drugs4e 1 7 or associated crack with whites as a racial group."8
By 1986, the media had labeled crack the most dangerous drug and
had decried the outbreak of a national "crack epidemic."1 9 The
media exacerbated white fears by warning of the potential for crack
to seep out of the inner city and into their neighborhoods,'
thereby spreading into the "higher social ranks of the country."42 1
"Crack has captured the ghetto," Newsweek declared, "and is inching
its way into the suburbs."422 In addition, the media often portrayed
whites hooked on crack as victims,4 23 succumbing to a drug forced
on them by unrelenting black dealers.424 Furthermore, if the
414. 132 CONG. REG. 8292 (1986) (citing Blythe, supra note 12); seeMorganthau et al., supra
note 403, at 16 (stating that dealers "organize small cells ofpushers, couriers and lookouts from
the ghetto's legion of unemployed teenagers" thereby suggesting blacks deal in crack), reprinted
in 132 CONG. REG. 13027 (1986).
415. See Morganthau et al., supra note 11, at 60 (declaring that "big city ghettos" were
"infested" with crack houses and were "centers for the new cocaine trade"), reprinted in 132
CONG. REc. 4419 (1986).
416. 132 CONG. REc. 8292 (1986) (citing Blythe, supra note 12).
417. Reed, supra note 410, at A25 (expressing dismay at media's relentlessly negative news
coverage of African Americans and Hispanic Americans); see Cal Thomas, Media OverlookingBlack
Success Stories, Sr. Louis PosT DISPATCH, Aug. 31, 1993, at B7 (lamenting fact that media largely
ignores positive images of blacks, such as Black Expo USA, event honoring black entrepreneurs).
418. SeeReed, supra note 410, atA25 (noting that according to Black Entertainment News, drug
stories focus on blacks 50% of time and whites only 32% of time).
419. See supra note 11 (noting, inter alia, that Newsweek announced crack to be biggest story
since Vietnam and fall of Nixon presidency and compared spread of crack with plagues of
medieval Europe). Newsweek solemnly proclaimed injune 1986, that "crack should be a leading
target for the nation's policymakers ... and a prime concern for Newsweek's readers." The Drug
Crisis: Crack and Crime, Newsweek, June 16, 1986, at 3.
420. See Morganthau et al., supra note 11, at 59 (noting that "[c] rack is not widely used in
many areas of the country-but that may only be a matter of time. It is already creating social
havoc in the ghettos of... large cities, and it is rapidly spreading into the suburbs."), reprinted
in 132 CONG. REC. 4418 (1986).
421. MusTo, supra note 75, at 43 (discussing underlying reason for congressional bill in 1914
that placed restrictions on cocaine).
422. Morganthau et al., supra note 403, at 16, reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 13,027 (1986).
423. See 132 CONG. REG. 8291, 8293-94 (1986) (citing Paul Blythe et al., Police Fast Being
Educated About Drug, PALNI BEACH POST & EVENING TIMES) (describing one white crack addict
as Jack, 37, one-time successful financial advisor with master's degree in psychology; another
white addict as "pretty young girl with dirty-blonde hair, deep blue eyes and a model's figure";
and third white addict asJoe, two-time winner of his troop's Boy Scout of Year Award, tall, wiry
blond).
424. See 132 CONG. REc. 8292 (1986) ("'Less than a block from where unsuspecting white
retirees play tennis, bands of young black men push their rocks on passing motorists.'" (quoting
Blythe, supra note 12)).
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prospect of crack coming to them was not bad enough, the media
warned of the horrors befalling whites who actually had to go into
black neighborhoods to purchase crack: "'For the growing number
of the white middle class who have become hooked on cocaine rock,
buying the drug can be like stepping into a foreign culture. ' ' 4"
The media thus presented the distorted image to the public that
young black men were solely responsible for the crack cocaine crisis
in America.426  This negative portrayal was undoubtedly a part of
this nation's perception of young black America. 27 Most (if not all)
Americans, then, attached racial significance to crack cocaine at the
time Congress provided the enhanced penalty provisions for
crack.42 Members of Congress did so also.
429
Throughout American history, our culture has frequently attached
racial meaning to crime and drugs. This Note presented evidence of
a history of associating crime with race, a history of attaching racial
connotations to certain drugs, and a widespread public association of
crack cocaine with race. This evidence supports the district court's
conclusion that "racial animus was a motivating factor in enacting the
425. 132 CONG. REG. 8294 (1986) (quoting Paul Blythe, Rock SeUers Neither Shy nor Unavailable,
PALM BEAcH PosT & EVENING TIMES).
426. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 783 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995); see Harris, supra note 9, at A26 (commenting that
media images ofdrugviolence have contributed to erroneous notion that cocaine crisis is rooted
in black America).
427. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 781 (noting that most whites are not introduced to image of
blacks as criminal through direct experience, but through media's promotion of these racial
caricatures). One commentator writes:
Each night in most major cities, local TV news flashes pictures of young black males
who have committed criminal acts or are the victims of crime. Handcuffed with head
down, or shot dead in the gutter or in body bags, this negative image of young black
America is tragically a part of the nation's consciousness.
Thomas, supra note 417, at B7. Steven Belton, a black attorney in Minneapolis, notes that this
negative image plays out in police enforcement. Meddis, supra note 4, at A2. He is quoted as
stating, "I guarantee you I can get arrested this weekend driving in certain neighborhoods in
this city at certain times of the day... [The police are] not stopping expensive foreign cars
with white male drivers over 40." Id.
428. See Claiy, 846 F. Supp. at 784 (concluding that stereotypical images of crack dealers as
young blacks "undoubtedly served as the touchstone that influenced racial perceptions held by
legislators and the public as related to the 'crack epidemic"'); see alsoPamelaj. Shoemaker, Drug
Coverage and Publk Opinion, 1972-1986, in COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS ABOUT DRUGS, supra note
400, at 67, 72-77 (studying Gallup polls and concluding that as media emphasized drug
problems, public increasingly listed drugs as most important problem facing America).
429. SeeLawrence, supra note 170, at 356 (stating that when society "thinks of governmental
action in racial terms," presumably "the socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes made
evidence by the action's meaning... influenced the decisionmakers"); see also State v. Russell,
477 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1991) (Yetka, J., concurring specially) ("Since all parties to this
lawsuit appear to agree that blacks constitute the largest percentage of crack users while whites
are the largest users of powder cocaine ... the legislature must be presumed to be aware of
these facts as well.").
1995] UNITED STATES V. CLARY 549
crack statute."4"° According to the district court, the threat of
"black crack" creeping into the white suburbs caused Congress to
disproportionately punish crack users and dealers more than their
white counterparts who used and dealt in powder cocaine.431
Consequently, Congress enacted the crack statute with its "Draconian"
punishment432 "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."41 3  The district
court's conclusion was correct under an equal protection analysis.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE CRACK STATUTE
The equal protection analysis begins with a look at the enactment
of the crack statute under the Washington v. Davis requirements for
proving racial discrimination.4" Under Davis, if intent to discrimi-
nate can be shown, courts will apply the strict scrutiny standard,
upholding the crack statute only if the government can show that the
classification is necessary to further a compelling government
interest.4" This Note concludes that the Eighth Circuit erred in
failing to find proof of discrimination. The district court, instead,
correctly applied the highest level of judicial scrutiny and properly
found the crack statute to be unconstitutional.
A. Proof of Racial Discrimination
As noted previously, the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's
findings that race was a motivating factor in enacting the crack
statute,436 concluding that unconscious racism4 "simply does not
address the question whether Congress acted with a discriminatory
430. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 787.
431. See id. at 784 (finding that legislators' public perceptions of "crack epidemic" in black
areas and threat of"black crack" moving into white suburbs caused legislators to act).
432. Id. (stating that public perceptions of crack epidemic were partly responsible for
drafting of draconian crack statute).
433. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citations omitted).
434. See supra Part I.B (discussing proof of racial discrimination under Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976)).
435. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny standard); see also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (holding that despite application of
strict scrutiny standard of review, internment ofJapanese-Americans during World War II was
"justified" due to national security concerns). Ironically, Korematsu was the first, and thus far,
the last time the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to constitutionally uphold disparate
treatment of a "racial group." LOCKHART ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CASES-COMMENTS-
QuESTIONS 1225 (7th ed. 1991).
436. See United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 1994) (conduding that district
court findings and record do not show discriminatory intent by Congress), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1172 (1995).
437. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 322 (explaining that unconscious racism occurs when
Americans discriminate on basis of race as result of common cultural experience without
conscious awareness or racist motivation).
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purpose."4' Thus, the Eighth Circuit found that unconscious
racism did not show that the legislature "selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. ';439  The
Eighth Circuit proceeded to dismiss the other.Arlington Heights factors
as insufficient to establish proof of racial discrimination." The
Eighth Circuit erred, however, in rejecting unconscious racism as an
appropriate method of proving discrimination." The unconscious
racial beliefs of the legislators, when considered along with other
Arlington Heights factors, including departures from normal proce-
dures, foreseeability of disparate impact, and adverse racial impact,
show that an invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor
in the enactment of the crack statute.
1. Unconscious racism
The law rarely considers the unconscious.' In at least three
instances, however, Supreme Court Justices have recognized uncon-
scious racism in their analyses of equal protection challenges.
443
Several lower federal courts have also adopted this theory in equal
protection cases. 4" Moreover, scholars and practitioners have
438. Cary, 34 F.3d at 713.
439. Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
440. Id. (rejecting inevitability or foreseeability of consequence of law, departures from
normal procedure sequence, and adverse racial impact claims).
441. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text (justifying relevance of unconscious
racism to equal protection analysis); infra notes 443-50 and accompanying text (discussing
reasons why courts should consider unconscious racism).
442. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 329 (noting that law considers unconscious in limited
circumstances, such as when medical. testimony illuminates mental state of criminal defendant
or mental pathology produced by alleged tort, neglectful parent, or deprivation of civil right).
443. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2364 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(recognizing unconscious racism in equal protection challenge to prevent criminal defendant
from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in exercise of peremptory challenges);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 328-35 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relying on
unconscious racism, together with statistics showing racial disparity, in imposition of death
sentence in Georgia to argue that death penalty, as applied to McCleskey, who was black, was
unconstitutional); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(invoking unconscious racism where prosecutor challenged potentiajurors through peremptory
challenges solely on basis of race).
444. SeeGonzalez-Riverav. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that Border
Patrol officers unconsciously might use race as proxy for illegal conduct because "racial
stereotypes often infect our decision making processes only subconsciously"); United States v.
Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 825-28 (9th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that racism often affects decision-
maldng only unconsciously); Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 863 (10th Cir. 1989)
(stating that presumption of dausal relationship between current racial and prior segregation
"ensures that subconscious racial discrimination does not perpetuate the denial of equal
protection to our nation's school children"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2994 (1993);. Harris v.
International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 ("Black Americans are regularly faced with
negative racial attitudei, many unconsciously held and acted upon, which are the natural
consequences of a society ingrained with cultural stereotypes and race-based beliefs and
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acknowledged unconscious discrimination in various contexts.
44
While not yet recognized in a majority opinion of the Supreme
Court,446 unconscious racism should be accepted as a factor in
proving racial discrimination because it addresses "subtle and deeply
buried forms of racism" not reachable under a traditional focus on
conscious intent. 7 Furthermore, unconscious racism comports
with the Supreme Court's instruction to look into whatever "circum-
stantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."'5 The
district court in Clary reached the same conclusion.449  It argued
that unconscious racism is an appropriate factor in determining
whether a racially discriminatory motive exists.45
Although intent per se may not have entered into the minds of
Congress in the enactment of the crack statute, failure to consider
Congress' unconscious racial perceptions in determining whether it
acted with an invidious purpose would violate "the spirit and letter of
equal protection."45' This Note explored the historical and social
context in which Congress made the allegedly discriminatory
decision452 and concluded that the crack statute conveys a symbolic
message to which our culture attaches racial significance.453 Telling-
preferences."), vacated in par4 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991).
445. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 4-5 (1987) (recognizing validity of Lawrence's unconscious racism theory); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016, 1017-25 (1988)
(recognizing unconscious racism in criminal procedure context); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of
America: Accen, Antidiscrimination Law, and aJurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE LJ.
1329, 1355-56 (1991) (acknowledging unconscious racism in area of speech evaluation, noting
unconscious bias against "low-status accents"). But seeLloyd Cohen, A Different Black Voice in Legal
Scholarship, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 301, 316-21 (1992) (dismissing Lawrence's personal
experiences with unconscious racism as misinterpretations of motives and beliefs of actors).
446. SeeUnited States v.Jackson, 856 F. Supp. 176,178 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that Supreme
Court has not recognized use of unconscious racism as proxy for showing discriminatory
purpose), af'd, 59 F.3d 1421 (2d Cir. 1995).
447. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 769, 781 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 -(8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995). The Supreme Court acknowledged in 1909 that
"'[racial] [b]ias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if
not impossible, to always recognize its existence.'" Id. (quoting Crawford v. United States, 212
U.S. 183, 196 (1909)).
448. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
449. See Clayy, 846 F. Supp. at 782 ("A current equal protection analysis must... take into
account the unconscious predispositions of people, including legislators, who may siricerely
believe that they are not making decisions on the basis of race.").
450. See id. (arguing that racial influences unconsciously affecting legislative decisionmaking
are no less injurious, reprehensible, or unconstitutional than conscious decisions); see also
Johnson, supra note 445, at 1034 (arguing that list of factors announced in Arlington Heights
should be revised to include "empirically verified indicia of unconscious racism, such as slips of
the tongue, microaggressions against the minority race litigant, avoidance of face-to-face
interactions with minorities, and the adoption of defensive rationalizations").
451. Clagy, 846 F. Supp. at 782.
452. See supra Part IV.C.1-3 (exploring unconscious racism and crack codaine).
453. See supra Part IV.C.3 (presenting society's correlation between crack cocaine and race).
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ly, members of Congress submitted into the Congressional Record
numerous media accounts that associated blacks with crack cocaine
and generated a public panic regarding crack. 4  Congress relied
on these submissions as support for enactment of the crack stat-
ute.455 As the district court noted, virtually "every newspaper
account featured a black male either using crack, selling crack,
involved in police contact due to crack, or behind bars because of
crack."456  Therefore, racial influences, at least unconsciously,
constituted a motivating factor in promulgating the enhanced penalty
provisions for possession and distribution of crack cocaine.
4 57
2. Departures from normal procedure sequence
The district court in Clary bolstered its conclusion that race and not
conduct was the determining factor in enacting the enhanced penalty
provisions with circumstantial evidentiary sources.458 For example,
the district court considered departures from the normal legislative
process in the enactment of the crack statute.4 59  The district court
explained that media accounts associating blacks with crack caused




454. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. 13,026-29 (1986) (reprinting article indicatingAmerica is losing
war on drugs); id. at 8291-99 (compiling articles detailing crack epidemic in West Palm Beach
County, Florida); id. at 4412-20 (including media accountwhich details neighborhood ice-cream
man selling crack to children). For a smattering of quotes from the Congressional Record, see
supra Introduction and Part IV.C.3.
455. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 783 (noting number of news articles associating crack with
blacks reproduced in Congressional Record and concluding that members of Congress used these
stories to support enactment of crack statute). Senator Chiles pointed to media reports as proof
of a crack epidemic in the congressional debates. He stated: "[W]e are saying that it is an
epidemic, you have your Newsweek story, you have Time magazine, The New York Times, you have
everybody in the world saying that we have an epidemic." Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10,
at 29.
456. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 785. In discussing the foreseeability of disparate impact, the
district court noted:
Media pictures and stories emphasized that the "crack problem" was a "black problem"
that needed to be isolated and prevented from "spreading" to white suburban areas.
The intent to contain the crack problem and prevent it from entering the "main-
stream" or the "suburbs" is evident from the articles cited in the Congressional Record.
To keep crack out of suburbia meant to keep crack users and dealers out of suburban
neighborhoods.
Id.
457. Id. at 787 (concluding that media-generated racial imagery formed partial basis for
Congress' enactment of crack statute).
458. See supra text accompanying note 68 (listing factors to be considered in determining
whether invidious discriminatory purpose motivated decision or action).
459. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 784-85 (noting evidence of "significant departures from prior
substantive and procedural sequences"); see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (noting that departures from normal procedure provide
evidence that improper purposes are afoot).
460. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 784 (detailing "'frenzied' state of Congress" during crack
debates).
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Eric E. Sterling, counsel to the House Subcommittee on Crime
during the crack debate, described the development of the sentencing
provisions in the crack statute as "extraordinary" in that Congress set
aside their careful deliberative practices.4 ' Sterling stated, "I
drafted the mandatory minimum sentences; they came out of my
word processor.... And I know how quickly they were written and
that they were not well thought out."462  Sterling compared the
debates in Congress to the floor of the Stock Exchange during a rush
to sell or buy a commodity.463 "It was sheer panic," he said,
"[e]veryone felt that the spotlight for solving the drug crisis was on
them. And if it wasn't, they wanted it to be on them."4"
This climate led some to characterize Congress as "frenzied" during
the crack debates. 4' The House held few hearings on the penalty
provisions," and the Senate conducted only a single hearing
between 9:40 a.m. and 1:15 p.m. 467  Moreover, although the penal-
ties were originally set at a fifty-to-one ratio, Congress later arbitrarily
doubled this ratio, apparently to "symbolize redoubled Congressional
461. See id. (citing Eric E. Sterling regarding "extraordinarily hasty and truncated legislative
process" preceding 1986 Controlled Substances Act into which crack statute was written). The
court credits Sterling with summarizing the typical legislative process and noted how the
sentencing provisions to the crack statute deviated from this procedure:
The development of [the 1986 Controlled Substances Act] was extraordinary. Typically
Members introduce bills which are referred to a subcommittee, and hearings are held
on the bills. Comment is invited from the Administration, the Judicial Conference,
and organizations that have expertise on the issue. A markup is held on a bill, and
amendments are offered to it. For [the 1986 Controlled Substances Act] much of this
procedure was dispensed with. The careful deiberative practices of the Congress were set aside
for the drug bilL
Id.
462. See Roman, supra note 8, at AS.
463. See Howard Manly, Harsh Line Drawn on Crack Cocaine: Tough Penalties Found to Affect
Blacks Most BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 1994, at 1, 14.
464. Manly, supra note 463, at 14. Former House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. returned
from his district, Boston, after the July 4th recess particularly energized. Id. Constituents had
bombarded O'Neill with horror and outrage over the cocaine overdose death of NCAA
basketball star and Boston Celtic draft pick Len Bias. Id. The Speaker told his colleagues to
conclude all committee work on the comprehensive crime bill within five weeks. Id. Sterling
stated:
In some sense, legislators viewed the crack epidemic the same way the Germans saw the
Jews. If only they could get rid of those people using crack, then we would have a
better society. All of our other problems would go away. The crime bill was the
distillation of every fear, anger and resentment that members of Congress felt about
their impotence to solve the scary things in life.
Id.
465. See Claqy, 846 F. Supp. at 784 (attributing departure from normal procedures to
"frenzied" state of Congress).
466. See id. (noting House's abbreviated consideration of bill).
467. See id. at 785 (addressing Senate's similarly cursory review of bill); Crack Cocaine Hearing,
supra note 10, at 1, 67 (recording time at beginning and at conclusion of hearing).
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seriousness."41 As the district court in Clary concluded, this evi-
dence of departures from prior procedural sequences points toward
an invidious discriminatory purpose.4 9
3. Inevitability orforeseeability of the consequences of the law
The district court next considered the inevitability or foreseeability
of the consequences of the crack statute as a method of proving
discriminatory intent.47° The Supreme Court in Personnel Administra-
tor v. Feeney stated that a court can reasonably draw a "strong
inference" that the adverse effects were desired when the law's adverse
consequences on an identifiable group are inevitable.471  The
district court reasoned that what cannot be clearly gleaned from the
discussions among members of Congress can be inferred from the
media reports introduced into the Congressional Record depicting
"heavy involvement by blacks in crack cocaine. '"472 Given the fact
that these news articles associated crack with blacks, it was foreseeable
that the enhanced penalties for possession and distribution of crack
cocaine would affect blacks disproportionately.
4 7
4. Adverse racial impact
Finally, circumstantial evidence of invidious discriminatory purpose
may include proof of disparate impact.474 The district court in Clary
noted undisputed evidence that the crack statute's impact "bears more
heavily" on blacks than whites.475' On a national level, 92.6% of
those convicted of federal crack cocaine violations in 1992 were black,
while only 4.7% were white.476 At the same time, 45.2% of those
sentenced for powder cocaine violations were white, while 20.7% were
468. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 784.
469. See id. (concluding that Congress acted on unconscious racial animus in departing from
normal procedures).
470. See id at 785.
471. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979) (discussing inevitability
or foreseeability of consequences of neutral law on issue of existence of discriminatory intent).
The Court emphasized that an inference from foreseeability of disparate impact is "a working
tool, not a synonym for proof." Id; see also Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick, 442 U.S. 449,464
(1979) (noting that actions performed with full knowledge of"forseeable and disparate impact
are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose") (citations omitted).
472. Clay, 846 F. Supp. at 785.
473. See i& (finding that "it was foreseeable that the harsh penalties imposed upon blacks
would be clearly disproportional to the far more lenient sentences given whites for use of the
same drug-cocaine").
474. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(stating that proof of intent can include proof of disproportionate impact on one race over
another (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976))).
475. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 786.
476. Id
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black.4" Moreover, of the defendants sentenced for simple posses-
sion of crack, all were black.47 In the Eastern District of Missouri,
where Edward Clary was prosecuted, 98.2% of the defendants
convicted for crack violations between the years 1988 and 1992 were
black. 79 In 1993, 88.3% of those convicted in federal court of
selling crack were black, while only 4.1% were white.48 In that
same year, only 27.4% of those convicted of selling powder cocaine
were black, and 32% were white.41' These striking disparities also
appear in state prosecutions.482
One reason for the disproportionate conviction rates is that there
is a disproportionate number of drug arrests in the black communi-
ty,483 even though the majority of drug users and traffickers are
white.484 A recent USA Today report, cited by the district court in
Claty,48 revealed that although blacks constitute 12% of the total
population and comprise approximately 12% of the illegal drug users
in the country, they accounted for almost 40% of those arrested on
drug charges in 1988 and 42% in 1991.486 Last year, blacks made
up 13% of the drug users, but accounted for 35% of drug arrests,
55% of convictions, and 74% of those sentenced to prison terms for
drug offenses.' 7 A black person in America is four times as likely
to be arrested on drug charges as a white person, 4W and a black
person is at least ten times as likely to be arrested for drugs as a white
person in at least thirty major cities.489
Thus, overwhelming statistical evidence shows that blacks are
prosecuted and convicted much more frequently for crack violations
than whites.4 ° Consequently, blacks are more likely than whites to
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. Between 1988 and 1990, of the 57 convictions for crack in the Eastern District of
Missouri, 56 were black and 1 was listed as white/Hispanic. Id. at 786 n.53.
480. Cocaine: Crack and Powder, supra note 21, at A20.
481. Cocaine: Crack and Powder, supra note 21, at A20.
482. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887 n.1 (Minn. 1991) (acknowledging that 92.6%
of all persons charged with possession of crack in 1988 in Minnesota were black while 79.6% of
all persons charged with possession of powder cocaine were white).
483. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 610 (noting that black males figure in 80-90%
of drug arrests nationally).
484. See supra notes 408-11 (looking at race of drug users and dealers).
485. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 786 (citing Meddis, supra note 4, at Al).
486. Meddis, supra note 4, at A2; see also supra note 410 (collecting statistics on racial
composition of drug users).
487. Thomas, supra note 6, at A4.
488. Meddis, supra note 4, atAl.
489. Meddis, supra note 4, at A2.
490. See United States v. McMurray, 833 F. Supp. 1454, 1460-61 (D. Neb. 1993) (noting
among other statistics, that in fiscal year 1991, 92.3% of defendants in Nebraska and 90.7% of
defendants nationally who were charged with federal crack violations were black), affd, 34 F.3d
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be given the harsh ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under the
crack statute.491 As a direct result of the frequent prosecutions and
high conviction rates under the mandatory minimum sentences for
drug offenses, the prison population incarcerated for drug offenses
in the Federal Bureau of Prisons has increased 90% in the last several
years.492  As of July 1993, 60.4% of the inmates in federal prisons
were incarcerated for drug related offenses. 3 Young black men
between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine, who comprise 4% of the
country's population, make up 50% of the total prison popula-
tion.
49 4
The district court in Clary found that the overwhelming evidence of
disproportionate, disparate treatment resulting from crack cocaine
sentences provided compelling proof of discrimination. 49 5 It even
suggested that these statistics alone may be enough to prove an equal
protection violation. 496  With some trepidation, the district court
declared that "if young white males were being incarcerated at the
same rate as young black males, the [crack] statute would have been
amended long ago."497 Others, too, have wondered whether constit-
uents would be pressuring the President and members of Congress to
amend the crack statute if whites were being jailed at the same rate
as blacks.498
1405 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denieA, 115 S. Ct. 1164 (1995).
491. See id. (noting that more frequent prosecution increases likelihood of blacks receiving
harsh minimum sentence).
492. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 769, 786, 786 n.62 (E.D. Mo.) (noting increase
in percentages of prison population incarcerated for drug offenses: 1970: 16.3%; 1980: 24.9%;
1985: 34.3%; 1990: 52.3%; 1992: 60.4%), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1172 (1995).
493. See id. at 786 (presenting proportion of inmates in federal prison for drug-related
offenses).
494. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 610 (citing gross disparities between young
black men calculated as percentage of general population and of prison population). In some
states, the figures are even more striking. Blacks and Latinos comprise 82% of the prison
population in New York state prisons. Id. at 610-11. In addition, minorities make up 95% of
the population in NewYork cityjails. Id. at 611; see also Thomas, supra note 6, atAl (reporting
that in 1994, 32% of black men between ages 20-29 were either in prison, in jail, on probation,
or on parole on any given day, while figure for white males was only 6.7%).
495. See Claiy, 846 F. Supp. at 787 (concluding that "stark" statistics form persuasive proof
of discrimination).
496. See id. (comparing this equal protection challnge to Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886), one of first Supreme Court cases ruling that law's effect may be so harsh or adverse to
particular race that intent to discriminate becomes not only permissible inference, but necessary
one).
497. Id. at 792.
498. See Harris, supra note 9, ai A26 (suggesting that political pressure would force
amendment if whites were jailed at same rate as blacks (citingAtlanta Police Chief Eldrin Bell));
Thomas, supra note 6, at A4 (crediting Marc Mayer, Assistant Director of Sentencing Project, as
stating, "If one in three white men were under criminal justice supervision, the nation would
declare a national emergency.").
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5. Racial discrimination established
Accordingly, based on unconscious racism and other Arlington
Heights factors,4' the Eighth Circuit erred in failing to find proof of
racial discrimination." Instead, the district court correctly conclud-
ed from the evidence "that racial animus was a motivating factor in
enacting the crack statute."5"' An unconscious fear of "black crack"
spreading into white suburbs led Congress to punish black crack
violators more severely than their white counterparts who used the
same drug, powder cocaine." 2 Congress departed from its normal
procedural patterns and reacted to the crack crisis in a "'frenzy'
initiated by the media and emotionally charged constituents." 3
Finally, the fruition of an overwhelmingly disparate impact in the few
years following the enactment of the crack statute was inevitable and
foreseeable.5"' Under the Supreme Court's instruction in Arlington
Heights to make a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available," 5 these factors show that
Congress enacted the crack statute "at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."505
B. Level ofJudicial Scrutiny
Having established proof of racial discrimination, a court must
apply strict scrutiny.1°7 The district court in Clary recognized that
the power of judicial review demands deference to the careful
considerations of the legislative branch."08 Once proof of discrimi-
nation is established, however, 'Judicial deference is no longerjusti-
499. See supra text accompanying note 68 (listing categories of circumstantial evidence
germane to showing discriminatory purpose).
500. See United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 713-15 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting lower court's
reliance on unconscious racism and disparate impact), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
501. Claty, 846 F. Supp. at 787.
502. I& at 784.
503. Id. at 787.
504. See id. at 785-87 (describing evidence of disparate impact such as increase in prison
population and disproportionality of crack convictions for blacks).
505. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
506. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see also Ciary, 846 F. Supp. at 791
(finding that "racial discriminatory influences, at least unconsciously, played an appreciable role
in promulgating the enhanced statutory scheme for possession and distribution of crack").
507. SeeMillerv.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2487 (1995) (recognizing that "statutes are subject
to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause not just when they contain express racial
classifications, but also when, though race neutral on their face, they are motivated by a racial
purpose or object").
508. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 791.
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fled."509 Consequently, the crack statute can survive an equal
protection analysis under the strict scrutiny standard only if the
government can show that the classification is necessary to further a
compelling government interest.510  Under this standard, the crack
statute is unconstitutional.51'
1. Compelling government interest?
Congress enacted the crack statute based on its belief that crack was
more dangerous than powder cocaine. 12 The government specifi-
cally pointed to evidence that members of Congress thought crack
posed a greater danger because of its potency, addictiveness, lower
cost, and growing prevalence."' Although not proffered as addi-
tional evidence of crack's alleged dangerousness in Clay,514 the
Senate hearings also reveal that members of Congress felt that crime
would significantly increase as a result of crack usage. 15 As the
district court in Clary noted, however, many of the legislators' beliefs
were not based on any evidence presented during the hearing.
516
Members of Congress failed to present factual or statistical evidence
showing that crack was more potent than powder cocaine.
517
Cocaine, in its various forms, can be ingested in several ways: chewing
509. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
510. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny standard).
511. See Claiy, 846 F. Supp. at 797 (holding crack statute to be unconstitutional in face of
Clary's equal protection challenge).
512. Seesupra notes 94-115 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' concerns underlying
enactment of crack statute).
513. Clay, 846 F. Supp. at 791; see also supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text (discussing
why Congress considered crack to be more dangerous than powder cocaine).
514. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 791 (responding to defense argument that statute was violative
of Equal Protection Clause based on race, government presented evidence that harsher penalties
for crack were based on congressional impression that crack is "more dangerous because of its
potency, its highly addictive nature, and increasing prevalence").
515. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (noting that Congress associated crack
with high levels of criminal activity).
516. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 791 (explaining that there was no medical evidence in crack
hearing testimony). All testimony consisted of generalizations regarding the differences in
danger levels between crack and powder cocaine. Id. The Eighth Circuit recognized that several
medical wimesses testifying before the district court contested the claim that crack is more
dangerous than powder cocaine. United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995). Apparently, the Eighth Circuit believed that this evidence
contradicting the claim that crack is more dangerous was not available to members of Congress
at the time of the crack hearing. See id. (stating that "[sIcientific disagreement with testimony
in congressional hearings, offered at a later time and after additional research, simply does not
establish.., a lack of scientific support for Congress' action" (emphasis added)). Much of the
medical evidence, however, was not only available to Congress at the time of the crack hearing
in a variety of sources, but experts testified in the actual crack hearing that crack is not more
dangerous than powder cocaine. See infra notes 551-54 and accompanying text (refuting claim
that crack is more dangerous than powder cocaine).
517. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 791.
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the coca leaves; inhaling or smoking vapors from cocaine base;
snorting the powdered form; and injecting the liquid form intrave-
nously.51 The pharmacological reactions to cocaine, regardless of
how ingested, "include euphoria, increased energy, enhanced
alertness and sensory experience, and elevated feelings of self-esteem
and self-confidence.""' a Dr. Charles R. Schuster testified before the
Senate that smoking crack (or freebase) cocaine or taking cocaine
intravenously will cause a person's plasma levels in the brain to go up
faster than taking the drug intranasally, where it is absorbed into the
body more slowly.52° Consequently, smoking cocaine or taking
cocaine intravenously will produce a more euphoric reaction521or
more intense "high" than snorting cocaine.522
Although use of crack and powder cocaine will result in varying
physical and psychological reactions, as detailed above, there is no
pharmacological evidence proving crack is a greater danger than
powder cocaine.523 It is the means of ingestion,. rather than any-
thing inherent in the crack cocaine substance, that makes crack
potentially more dangerous. 24 "[T]he cocaine molecule is the same
518. See generally Inciardi, supra note 78, at 461-68 (detailing different means of ingestion).
519. SeeWAU.ACE, supra note 15, at 10 (discussing pharmacology of cocaine and its addictive
nature).
520. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 16 (testimony of Dr. Schuster); see also id at 9
(prepared statement of Sen. Chiles) (stating that cocaine, when smoked, will reach brain in
under 10 seconds, while snort of powder cocaine can take up to eight minutes). For a
discussion of how different methods of ingesting cocaine influence the brain, see Lowney, supra
note 84, at 150-51. Lowney notes that, when comparing effects of different methods of ingestion
by looking at level of cocaine which reaches brain (called "mean cocaine plasma level"), cocaine
taken intravenously results in highest mean cocaine plasma level at fastest rate; smoking cocaine
leads plasma level to peak sooner than snorting it, but snorting gradually causes cocaine plasma
level to rise higher. Id.
521. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 16 (testimony of Dr. Schuster).
522. See Lowney, supra note 84, at 150-51 (explaining how intravenously ingesting cocaine
produces high of greater intensity than smoking, that both highs peak within few minutes of
taking drug, and that highs are limited in duration). In contrast, snorting cocaine results in a
high that is half as strong as smoking, does not peak until about 20 minutes after consumption,
but whose effects last for more than two hours. Id.
523. Lowney, supra note 84, at 151. Lowney notes that the effect of smoking crack on the
cardiovascular system is comparable to snorting cocaine or taking it intravenously. See id
(describing mean heart rate increase and time to maximum increase for cocaine users (citing
Reese T.Jones, The Pharmacology of Cocaine Smoking in Humans, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG
ABUSE RESEARCH MONOGRAPH No. 99: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON SMOKING OF ABUSED SUBSTANCES
35-36 (C. Nora Chiang & Richard L. Hawks eds., 1990))). These rates are: 46 Beats Per Minute
(BPM) after 10 minutes for intravenous users; 32 BPM after 2 minutes for smokers; and 26 BPM
after 40 minutes for snorters. Id. In addition, there is no evidence that use of crack, as opposed
to powder cocaine, renders the user physiologically or psychologically more inclined to perform
violent or other antisocial acts. Clar7y, 846 F. Supp. at 792. Furthermore, researchers conclude
that the "short-term and long-term effects of crack and powder cocaine are identical." Id.
524. See Crack Coraine Hearing, supra note 10, at 20 (testimony of Robert Byck, M.D., Professor
of Psychiatry and Pharmacology, Yale University School of Medicine). Dr. Byck asserted:
You can pack your nose [with powder cocaine] only so far, but you can keep breathing
[cocaine base, of which crack is one form] for a long time. As long as you can keep
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whether the drug being used is in powder form or in crack form, and
is not inherently more dangerous in crack form."5" Additionally,
crack is not, despite legislators' claims to the contrary 2  purified
cocaine. 27 It simply does not make sense, therefore, to single out
smoking crack cocaine for enhanced punishments, especially when
other forms of ingestion, specifically intravenous use, produce
substantially the same effect. 28  As one court concluded,
"[d]isparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine users is not
justified on the basis of crack's greater dangerousness when there is
evidence that powder cocaine could readily produce the effects
purported to justify a harsher penalty for possession of crack." 29
Likewise, crack is not more addictive than powder cocaine. 
5 0
Despite media reports claiming almost instantaneous addiction, 53
Dr. Byck and Dr. Schuster testified before the Senate that they had no
breathing cocaine vapor, you can get more of a dosage into yourself. That is the
reason why crack, or cocaine free-base, is so dangerous.
It; see also State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 1991) (noting that "evidence as to the
degree of dangerousness between crack and cocaine powder is based on testimony as to effects
resulting from different methods of ingestion, rather than on an inherent difference between
the forms of the drug").
525. United States v. Majied, No. 8:91-00038(02), 1993 WL 315987, at *5 (D. Neb.July 29,
1993) (declining to follow sentencing guidelines for crack violation because crack and cocaine
are equivalent in terms of danger and because disparate impact on African Americans from
these penalties was not contemplated); see also Russell 477 N.W.2d at 890 (noting that"the mood
altering ingredient in both powder and base was the same-cocaine").
526. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (discussing members of Congress' belief
that crack is purified cocaine).
527. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at 469 (explaining method by which crack is processed and
concluding that it is not purified cocaine). Inciardi also explains that "crack generally contains
much of the filler and impurities found in the original cocaine hydrochloride, along with some
of the baking soda from the processing." Id.
528. See supra notes 520-27 and accompanying text (noting similarity between smoking crack
and taking cocaine intravenously); see also Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 30 (statement
of Dr. Schuster) ("It is comparable to intravenous cocaine."). But see idt at 30 (statement of Sen.
Chlles) ("Cocaine is dangerous, but if you compare cocaine snorting to crack, it is like
comparing a kitty to a skunk as far as the severity of the problem.").
529. Russell 477 N.W.2d at 890.
530. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 792 (E.D. Mo.), reu'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied; 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
531. See 132 CONG. REC. 4412 (1986) (citing Arnold Washton, specialist at Fair Oaks
Hospital). Mr. Washton stated that "[c]rack is almost instantaneous addiction .... It is the
most addictive drug known to man right now." It.; see also 132 CONG. REC. 8292 (1986) (citing
Blythe, supra note 12) (reporting that crack appears to cause addiction quicker than other forms
of cocaine, estimating dependency on crack within five to six weeks compared to four or five
years with powder cocaine); Kerr, supra note 11, atA18 (claiming that crack sometimes causes
addiction within days or weeks); Lamar, supra note 11, at 16 (claiming that crack is highly
addictive form of cocaine); Morganthau et al., supra note 11, at 58 (declaring that crack is much
more addictive than powder cocaine), reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. 4418 (1986); Smith, supra note
11, at 15 (stating that crack is "newest, purest and most addictive commodity now on the
market").
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evidence showing the rate of addictiveness of crack.532 Independent
field studies, conducted by Dr. Inciardi on hard-core drug-using
delinquents in Miami in 1986, led Dr. Inciardi to conclude that,
"although there is no question as to the seductive nature of both
cocaine and crack... [there was] hardly an indication of compulsive
and uncontrollable use."53 In fact, Inciardi's study revealed that
the "drug of choice" for most crack users was not crack, but powder
cocaine and marijuana." Thus, objective evidence contradicts
Congress' claim that the drug classifications in the crack statute were
appropriately based on crack's pharmacological effects. 5
Supporters of the crack statute were correct in asserting that crack
was available in small packets at a low unit price.536 In 1986, the
user could purchase a single dose of crack for around ten dollars
while the smallest unit of powder cocaine typically available at the
retail level-one gram-cost about one hundred dollars.53 7  Thus,
a single dose of crack was easier to afford than powder cocaine.-3
8
But this was because of the packaging-one dose versus one
gram-not anything inherent in the retail value of the drugs. In fact,
the street price per gram of the two substances is frequently equal,
and crack is sometimes more expensive than powder cocaine.5 9 As
the district court in Clary explained, because cocaine is the primary
532. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 19 (testimony of Dr. Byck) ("How likely is
it, if someone smokes some crack today, that they will be addicted 5 weeks from now. We don't
know the answers to a simple question like that.... ."); id at 28 (statement of Sen. Chiles) ("At
what frequency level of crack use does one become physically dependent on the drug?" Dr.
Byck: "I don't know the answer to that question." Mr. Schuster "No, I don't think that we
have the answer to that question.").
533. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 484. Inciardi's study revealed that approximately 92.5% of
the subjects used crack during the three month period prior to the interview, and of these
nearly two-thirds were not daily users. Id
534. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at 485 (noting that interviews with drug users suggested that
cocaine and marijuana were preferred, and that crack was just "a cheap, quick high"); see also
Weisman, supra note 15, at 16 (noting that 54% of high school seniors have tried marijuana and
that marijuana remains America's most popular illegal drug).
535. See supra notes 518-27 and accompanying text (discussing evidence which proves
pharmacological effects of crack are comparable to other forms of cocaine).
536. See Crack CocaieRHearing, supranote 10, at 15 (testimony of Dr. Schuster) (testifying that
crack is packaged and marketed in small vials containing one dose and sold for around $10).
537. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 15 (testimony of Dr. Schuster) (noting that
packaging of crack in small containers lowers price barrier, thus allowing ease of purchase by
younger or less affluent persons); Inciardi, supra note 78, at 485 (noting that "smallest unit of
cocaine available at retail level was one gram at $75, a costlier purchase than a $5 or $10 hit of
crack"); Cf OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 5, at 7 (stating that in 1994
prices for crack varied from $2 or $3 in some states to $10 to $30 in others, and prices for
cocaine varied from $50 to $100 per gram).
538. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 485.
539. Lowney, supra note 84, at 153.
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product of crack, crack is not less expensive than powder cocaine. 40
Furthermore, as Senator Chiles recognized, repeated use of crack
could potentially cost hundreds of dollars per week.
541
Evidence revealed that although the media declared a crack
epidemic and contended that crack presented the number one drug
problem facing the nation," crack has not led to an increase in
cocaine use.54 Rather than a national epidemic, researchers have
found crack to be a problem unique to inner cities of not less than
a dozen urban areas." 4 The Drug Enforcement Administration, in
fact, concluded that crack represented only a "secondary problem" in
the overall drug issue facing the country.5" Yet Congress and the
media chose to ignore this evidence, instead continuing to hype crack
as the wave of the future."4 At most, one could safely argue, as the
court in Clary did, that "all forms of cocaine are available today in
greater quantities and at lower prices than a few years ago." 7  But
540. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 792 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
541. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 9 (prepared statement of Sen. Chiles).
542. See supra note 11 (noting, for example, that Newsweek announced crack to be biggest
story since Vietnam and ifal of Nixon presidency and compared spread of crack with plagues of
medieval Europe); cf. Weisman, supra note 15, at 17 (crediting Bill Gregory, spokesman for
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse, with stating that "[a] Icohol is our nation's No. I drug abuse
problem").
543. See Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 26 (statement of Dr. Schuster) (according
to Dr. Schuster, growth in cocaine abuse occurred between 1979 and early 1980s, but since that
time number of users has remained relatively constant); see also Weisman, supra note 15, at 15
(presenting NIDA figures revealing that percentage of high school seniors admitting to using
cocaine at least once remained stable at 17% in 1981, 16% in 1982-84, and 17% in 1985).
544. Inciardi, supra note 78, at 482. Senator Chiles probed Dr. Schuster on how statistical
evidence could show that cocaine use was stable on a national level when everyone spoke in
terms of a crack epidemic. Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 28 (statement of Dr.
Schuster). Dr. Schuster responded that "[t ] here can be large changes in specific locales, without
that necessarily producing a major change in the national statistics." Id.
545. See Inciardi, supra note 78, at 482 (citing 1986 DEA report determinations). The report
stated:
Crack is currently the subject of considerable media attention. The result has been a
distortion of the public perception of the extent of crack use as compared to the use
of other drugs. With multikilogram quantities of cocaine hydrochloride available and
with snorting continuing to be the primary route of cocaine administration, crack
presently appears to be a secondry rather than primay problem in most areas.
Id. (citing Drug EnforcementAdministration, SpecialReport: The Crack Situation in the United States
(unpublished release from the Strategic Intelligence Section, Drug EnforcementAdministration,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 22, 1986)).
546. Jane Gross, A New, Purfied Form of Cocaine Causes Alarm as Abuse Increases, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1985, atAl. Upset at Dr. Schuster for testifying that national statistics illustrated that
cocaine use had levelled off, Senator Chiles argued that using these statistics was a "great
disservice to what is happening out there." Crack Cocaine Hearing, supra note 10, at 29. As proof
of a crack epidemic, Senator Chiles pointed to media reports. See id. ("[W]e are saying that it
is an epidemic, you have your Newsweek story, you have Time magazine, The New York Times, you
have everybody in the world saying that we have an epidemic.").
547. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 792 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
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evidence contradicts the claim that crack has permeated the drug
culture.5 4
Finally, although not proffered as evidence tending to show crack's
dangerousness in Clary, the media and Congress promoted the idea
that crack use led to an increase in crime.549 While crime accompa-
nies drugs generally,"5 ° there is simply no evidence to support the
assertion that crack specifically leads to an increase in property crimes
or crimes against persons.551 Nor is there support for the argument
that crack dealers are somehow more evil than powder cocaine
dealers because cocaine dealers sell the cocaine to make crack.552
As such, equating culpability to power in the drug trade suggests that
cocaine dealers are more culpable than crack users or small scale
crack dealers.553
Thus, as Senator Hawkins stated during the introduction of the
amendment to the Controlled Substance Act, "the dividing line
between crack and powder cocaine is indistinct and arbitrary."554
The lack of objective evidence supporting the drug classifications and
punishment decisions in the crack statute is apparent.5 55  While
recognizing the pressures on Congress to respond to the arrival of
crack cocaine, the district court in Clary found that "the frenzied,
irrational response to criminalize crack at 100 times greater than
powder cocaine, in a manner that would disproportionately affect
548. See supra note 545 (noting DEA's conclusion about prevalence of crack within drug
community).
549. See supra notes 113-15 (noting that Senator Nunn warned of possibility of more crime
accompanying crack); see also 132 CONG. REc. 8292 (1986) (citing Blythe, supra note 12) (noting
that although police admit there is insufficient evidence linking increase in cocaine use to
increase in crime, they believe crack's addictive character will lead to increase in property crimes
because sometimes stolen goods are found where crack is sold); Peter Kerr, Growth in Heroin Use
Ending as City Users Turn to Crack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,1986, atAl (claiming that transition from
heroin to crack may lead to increase in violent crimes); Lamar, supra note 11, at 17 (noting that
"police have attributed a rash of brutal crimes to young addicts virtually deranged [by crack]").
550. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 608 (commenting that growth in violent crimes
is result of profit in illicit drug trade and of turf wars between drug dealers).
551. See C/ay, 846 F. Supp. at 792 (noting that there is no evidence that use of crack, as
opposed to powder cocaine, renders user physiologically or psychologically more inclined to
perform violent or other antisocial acts).
552. See Lowney, supra note 84, at 152 (discussing fact that all sales of crack depend on sale
from cocaine dealer first, and that cocaine dealers may therefore be more powerful in drug
distribution chain).
553. Lowney, supra note 84, at 153; see C/ary, 846 F. Supp. at 788 (noting that amount of
crack cocaine for 56 of 57 defendants in Eastern District of Missouri between 1988 and 1992
totaled under 4000 grams). The court also asserted that "the removal of this small quantity of
drugs would hardly reduce the supply of crack cocaine in St. Louis or impede its flow." Id.
554. 132 CONG. REc. 17,918 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hawkins) (arguing that focus of law
enforcement efforts should be on cocaine generally, not its various forms).
555. See Lowney, supra note 84, at 137 (noting that "lack of objective criteria guiding
legislators in determining drug classification and penalty determination allows social and racial
biases to shape drug policies").
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blacks, is unjustified."556  Accordingly, it properly held that the
government failed to show a compelling government interest in the
enhanced penalty provisions for possession and distribution of crack
cocaine.557
2. Necessary means?
Even assuming Congress' interests were compelling, it failed to draft
the crack statute in terms narrowly tailored to achieve those inter-
ests.558 The district court in Clary reasoned that it is illogical to
mandate a harsher penalty on a derivative source of an illicit drug,
while the original form of the drug is afforded greater tolerance.
5 59
The district court emphasized that "[c]ocaine is cocaine,"5" and
that legislators should punish the possession and distribution of
powder cocaine with equal severity as crack cocaine.56' As one court
noted, if society seeks to eliminate cocaine use, then it ought to
impose harsh penalties not just for the possession, use and distribu-
tion of crack, but also of cocaine in all other forms. 62 Those
penalties, the court stated, should be "equally and uniformly
applied."5 6" Thus, the district court in Clary properly held that the
enhanced penalty provisions for crack cocaine were not necessary to
further a compelling government interest 564 Accordingly, the crack
statute5" violates the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.5-
CONCLUSION
Few will dispute that this country has a drug problem,567 and
nobody, least of all legislators, will defend drug abuse in America. It
should come as no surprise, therefore, that Congress reacted quickly
and decisively to the media exploitation of the drug issue .51 With
556. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 792-93.
557. Id. at 793.
558. See id. (concluding that crack statute was not narrowly drawn).




562. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1991) (Yetka,J., concurring specially).
563. I& (Yetka, J., concurring specially).
564. Claqy, 846 F. Supp. at 793.
565. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994).
566. See Ciaiy, 846 F. Supp. at 797 (holding crack statute to be unconstitutional).
-567. powell & Hershenov, supra note 2, at 559.
568. See Reese & Danielian, supra note 401, at 32 (admitting that drug issue is "big story that
may have been blown out of proportion by the media"); Weisman, supra note 15, at 15 (rejecting
notion that America was in midst of crack epidemic).
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their constituents demanding action, any legislator failing to respond
risked being labeled "soft on crime" and faced almost certain defeat
in the next election. 569
Congress is not set, by and large, on discriminating against black
people or furthering the vestiges of racism.57' But men and women
who would not overtly discriminate against someone because of race
can, because of this country's racist past (and present), unconsciously
take race into account in their decisionmaking.57' The unconscious
racial beliefs of members of Congress entered into the promulgation
of the enhanced penalty provisions found in the crack statute. These
beliefs, considered along with the Arlington Heights factors, show that
racial animus constituted a motivating factor behind the enactment
of the crack statute. Therefore, because the crack statute fails to pass
strict scrutiny, it violates the equal protection rights of black Ameri-
cans. Cocaine, really, is cocaine.
572
569. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 794 (recognizing pressure on members of Congress to
confront drug issue).
570. Id
571. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 321-22 (outlining basic theory of unconscious racism).
572. See Clarj, 846 F. Supp. at 793 (emphasizing that "cocaine is cocaine" and therefore
punishment for crack and powder cocaine should be equal).
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